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HE basic facts appear in almost every introductory tax law
casebook. During the first four months of 1980, David Zarin, a
widely respected real estate developer who had contributed signif-
icantly to the development of Atlantic City, lost control of his gambling.1
At the height of his compulsion, he played craps twelve to sixteen hours a
day, seven days a week, betting as much as $15,000 on each roll of the
dice.2 During that four-month period alone, he probably placed over
$125 million in bets.3 A New Jersey regulator called him "the biggest
casino credit player here or in Nevada."'4 The casino, Resorts Interna-
tional ("Resorts"), rewarded him with a luxury three-room suite, meals,
entertainment, and twenty-four-hour access to a limousine.5
Then his bank refused to honor his checks-3,435,000 worth.6 The
casino sued;7 he countersued. 8 A year later, the parties settled. Zarin
agreed to pay Resorts $500,000; the casino dropped its remaining claims.
Over a two-year period Zarin had lost almost $6 million to gambling; the
settlement reduced his out-of-pocket losses to a mere $3 million.9 He was
insolvent 10 but sober. He joined Gamblers Anonymous and became
Chair of the Advisory Board to the National Foundation for the Study of
Pathological Gambling.11 He never gambled again.12
Some would view Zarin's story as a precautionary tale on the perils of
compulsive gambling.13 The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") saw in-
stead a $2,935,000 taxable debt discharge.1 4 At a seventy percent rate,
* Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This article is published with David
Zarin's permission.
1. See Stipulation of Facts at 11, Zarin v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1084 (1989) (No.
21371-86) (1989) [hereinafter Stipulation].
2. Id.
3. See infra note 45.
4. See Daniel Heneghan, Resorts Fined for Credit, ATLANTIC CiTY PRESS, July 7,
1983, at 22 (statement attributed to New Jersey Casino Control Commissioner Carl Zeitz).
5. Stipulation, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Id. at 12.
7. See Zarin v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing the 1980 claim
against Zarin).
8. Id.
9. Stipulation, supra note 1, at 14.
10. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.






this implied a federal income tax liability of over $2 million. 15 By the
time the issue reached the courts almost a decade later, the IRS claimed
some $5.2 million in back taxes and interest. 16 Zarin lost in the Tax Court,
eleven to eight.17 He won in the Third Circuit, two to one.18 After ten
long years, at age seventy-two, he was free.19
To his great distress, David Zarin has become the most famous gambler
in United States tax history. Yet one might wonder why the tax case that
bears his name has been so widely read and analyzed. After all, its fact
pattern is unlikely to be repeated. Its direct precedential value, there-
fore, is minimal.20
The answer lies in the often misunderstood nature of law. A simple
model of statutory law, common among students, reads something like
this: Congress enacts rules. Courts find facts and apply the rules to the
facts or, at most, fill gaps in existing rules. All a student need do is to
memorize the rules (or, if the exam is open book, know where to look
them up) and discuss their application in the classic "on-the-one-hand,
on-the-other-hand" tradition.
But law is not simply the application of rules to facts. Its goals are
more profound; its means more subtle. Ultimately, law uses words, ideas,
and processes to limit the exercise of power, implement norms, and cre-
ate some degree of social order, legitimacy, and perceived equality. A
"rule" is merely a requirement that similar situations be treated similarly;
its function is to constrain.21 But reality is infinitely complex, and our
moral and political judgments richly nuanced. To be workable, therefore,
law must simplify. To this end, our legal system reduces bewildering real-
ity to a few manageable "material facts" and complex moral and political
conclusions to rote phrases. Ultimately, courts do apply rules to facts, but
this is merely one step in a much more complicated process.
15. Id.
16. See Zarin v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the total tax bill
to April 5, 1990, reached $5,209,033.96).
17. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1085 (1989), rev'd, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
18. Zarin, 916 F.2d at 117.
19. See id.
20. The Tax Court does not appear to have accepted any of the Third Circuit's conclu-
sions in Zarin. See generally, e.g., Rood v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3125 n.1 (1996)
(addressing whether the disputed debt rule applies only to an unliquidated debt, as held by
the Zarin Tax Court majority, or also to a debt the enforceability of which is disputed, as
held by the Third Circuit, an issue that still remains open); Collins v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M.
(CCH) 557 n.9 (1992), affd, 3 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that it was not bound by
Third Circuit's conclusion that casino chips have no value); Schlifke v. Comm'r, 61 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1697, 1698 (1991) (stating that
we find it unnecessary to cut our way through the thicket of sub-issues which
inhere in [the Zarin] controversy, such as the presence of a liquidated, as
distinguished from an unliquidated, indebtedness, and the enforceability of
the underlying obligation, i.e., whether it is void or voidable and the impact
of the element of rescission thereon.).
21. Perhaps for this reason, rule making and rule application are normally allocated to
different bodies. See, e.g., TiE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504, 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ed-
ward Mead Earle ed., 1937). A rulemaking body normally has the power to change rules
and is therefore less constrained by existing rules.
1762 [Vol. 59
One might expect a legal system based on sometimes cartoonish simpli-
fication to be unsatisfactory. Legitimacy requires more than mere consis-
tency; it also requires some adherence to intuitive notions of right and
wrong. Nevertheless, in the run-of-the-mill case our system works sur-
prisingly wcll. It breaks down primarily in cases for which the articulated
rules were not designed. By studying how and when the system breaks
down, we can better understand how it works-or, indeed, perhaps even
how to make it work better. For this reason, law school texts often in-
clude atypical cases, cases in which the articulated rules do not quite
work. Legal scholarship focuses disproportionately on such cases as well.
Zarin v. Commissioner is one such case. 22 Much has been written
about Zarin,23 which has become one of the most widely-used teaching
cases in tax law. 24 To date, however, published analyses appear to have
22. See generally Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084.
23. See generally, e.g., Babette B. Barton, Legal and Tax Incidents of Compulsive Be-
havior: Lessons from Zarin, 45 TAX LAW. 749 (1992); Richard C.E. Beck, Cancellation of
Debt and Other Incidental Items of Income: Puritan Tax Rules in the U.S., 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 695 (2004); William R. Culp, Jr. & Richard E. Marsh, Jr., Avoiding Cancellation of
Debt Income Where the Liability Is Disputed, 74 J. TAX'N 288 (1991); Joseph M. Dodge,
Zarin v. Commissioner: Musings About Debt Cancellations and "Consumption" in an In-
come Tax Base, 45 TAX L. REV. 677 (1990); Kurt H. Eberle, Challenges to Enforceability of
a Debt Do Not Trigger the Contested Liability Exception to the Discharge-of-Indebtedness
Income Rule: Preslar v. Commissioner, 53 TAX LAW. 535, 536 (2000); Gregory M. Giangi-
ordano, Taxation-Discharge of Indebtedness Income-Zarin v. Commissioner, 64 TEMP.
L. REV. 1189 (1991); Stephen D.D. Hamilton, Third Circuit's Contingent Liability Theory
Produces Correct Result in Gambling Debt Discharge Case, 50 TAX NOTES 409 (1991);
Calvin H. Johnson, Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models for Gambling Losses and
the Forgiveness of Gambling Debts, 45 TAX L. REv. 697 (1990); I. Jay Katz, Did Zarin Have
a Tufts Day at a Casino Made out of Kirby Lumber?, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261 (1993);
Douglas E. Kulper, Note, Taxpayer Rolls the Dice and the IRS Craps Out: Forgiveness of
Gambling Debts Is Not Income in Zarin v. Commissioner, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 617 (1991);
James L. Musselman, Is Income from Discharge of Indebtedness Really Income at All? A
Proposal for a More Reasoned Analysis, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 607, 616 (2004); Robert G.
Nassau, Cancellation of Gambling Debts and Not-So-Phantom Income, 50 TAX NOTES 188
(1991); Joel S. Newman, Five Will Get You Ten: You Haven't Heard the Last About Zarin,
50 TAX NOTES 667, 668 (1991); Chad J. Pomeroy, Preslar v. Commissioner: Debt Discharge
Income and Its Rationale, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1677, 1685 (2000); Jon D. Rigney, Note,
Zarin v. Commissioner, The Continuing Validity of Case Law Exceptions to Discharge of
Indebtedness Income, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 981 (1991); Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic In-
come Revisited: Response to Professors Johnson and Dodge, 45 TAX L. REV. 707 (1990);
Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measure-
ment of Taxable Consumption. 45 TAX L. REV. 215 (1990); Lee A. Sheppard, A Gambling
Exception to Cancellation of Indebtedness Income?, 49 TAX NOTES 1516 (1990); Susan
Clark Taylor, Comment, Income Taxation-Zarin v. Commissioner: The Viability of the
Transactional Approach to Discharge of Indebtedness Income, 20 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 235,
242 (1990); Stephen A. Zorn, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Gambling: Fairness or
Obsolete Moralism?, 49 TAX LAW. 1 (1995); Mark J. Marroni, Comment, Zarin v. Commis-
sioner: Does a Gambler Have Income from the Cancellation of a Casino Debt?, 27 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 993 (1993).
24. Zarin appears in almost every major introductory U.S. tax casebook. See, e.g., J.
MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 165-66 (7th ed.
2004); JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND
POLICY 312-20 (3d ed. 2004); JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 166-75 (13th ed. 2004); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 180-88 (5th ed. 2005); SANFORD
M. GUERIN & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME
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been based solely on the two published court opinions, which omit much
that is relevant to an understanding of the case. I was principal author of
the briefs filed on Zarin's behalf before the Third Circuit.2 5 Since moving
to law-teaching, I have remained puzzled about the problems the case
presents. 26 This Article, therefore, is both a practitioner's and a theorist's
account of Zarin, a story of the intersection of process, doctrine, and the-
ory, a story of how law works-and how it sometimes fails.
I. WHAT HAPPENED: A PRACTITIONER'S ACCOUNT
A. How IT BEGAN
Some lawsuits are brought to implement policy decisions, some to re-
solve pre-existing political or business controversies, some as expressions
of personal ill-will. Zarin arose almost by accident, a fact that affected
how it was litigated and ultimately decided.
How did Zarin begin? More to the point, why did the IRS raise the
debt discharge claim at all? Large numbers of gamblers default on their
casino debts every year;27 it is unlikely that any of them ever report their
defaulted debt as income. The only prior case to consider the issue held
that a discharge of gambling debt was not income. 28 Had Zarin lost, he
might well have been the first taxpayer in American history to have paid
federal income tax because of a discharge of gambling debt.2 9 If one of
TAXATION 51-56 (6th ed. 2002); ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND
PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 132-38 (5th ed. 2002); DOUGLAS A. KAHN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 71-75 (3d ed. 1994); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 150-59 (14th ed. 2006); MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING,
& POLICY 253-65 (2003); LAURIE L. MALMAN ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 153-63 (2002); JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION 50-59 (2002); RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 240-49 (2004); RICHARD WESTIN, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 67-75
(2002). See also MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 55-57 (10th ed.
2005).
25. Also contributing significantly to the briefs were William M. Goldstein, Harry L.
Gutman, and Stephen D.D. Hamilton. Mr. Goldstein argued the case before the Third
Circuit.
26. My exploration of the debt discharge doctrine as a whole appears in Theodore P.
Seto, The Function of the Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in the
Federal Income Tax System, 51 TAX L. REV. 199 (1996).
27. In 1981, Atlantic City casinos extended $1,045,070,361 in credit; comparable statis-
tics are apparently not publicly available for Nevada casinos, although total gambling vol-
ume is higher in Nevada. See VICKI ABT ET AL., THE BUSINESS OF RISK: COMMERCIAL
GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA 76 (1985). Several decisions have estimated that
collections on such credit average roughly ninety-six percent. See, e.g., Flamingo Resort,
Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982);
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1033, 1044 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d
1229 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Rev. Rul. 83-106, 1983-2 C.B. 77.
This would imply a 1981 casino debt default volume for Atlantic City of some $40 million,
and for the United States as a whole in excess of $100 million.
28. See United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 242 (10th Cir. 1962).
29. Since Zarin, the IRS has once successfully contended that a discharge of enforcea-
ble casino gambling debt is taxable. See Rood v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3125 (1996)
(holding that a taxpayer failed to prove that casino gambling debt was disputed).
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the goals of law is to treat equally situated people equally, the very bring-
ing of the case might seem improper.
The answer is simple: Zarin did not begin as a debt discharge case.
David Zarin was a well-known, widely-respected public figure in Atlantic
City-a pioneering real estate developer responsible for much of the
city's modern low-income and senior housing.30 His troubles at Resorts
quickly became newsworthy. 31 Resorts charged Zarin with intentionally
writing bad checks-a fraudulent act.32 Zarin was even criminally in-
dicted.33 Zarin, in turn, accused Resorts of Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization ("RICO") violations.34 The New Jersey gaming
authorities filed a complaint against Resorts alleging violations of the ca-
sino credit laws, 35 a case that settled when Resorts conceded fault and
agreed to be fined.36
In effect, Zarin was accused of having taken something without paying
for it. Initially, therefore, the IRS sought merely to tax him on the pro-
ceeds of that alleged "theft." Its notice of deficiency asserted that he had
realized taxable income in 1980-the year of the gambling fiasco, not the
year of the settlement-"in the amount of $3,435,000 as a result of lar-
ceny by trick and deception. ' 37 Thus, Zarin was originally a 1980 in-
come-by-theft case, not a 1981 discharge-of-indebtedness case.
30. See, e.g., Stipulation, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing that Zarin built 643 units for
low-income families and the elderly in 1978 and 1979); WHO'S WHO IN THE EAST (22d ed.
1989) (recipient, Concern for People of Atlantic City Award, Atlantic City 1984; Citizen of
Vision Award, N.J. Assembly 1985; Legion of Honor Award, Chapel of Four Chaplains
1985); Michael Checcio, Zarin, Sailor Honored for A.C. Work, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS,
Nov. 7, 1987 (Greater Atlantic City Chamber of Commerce business man of the year);
Joann S. Lublin, Controversial Federal Program Helps Developer to Build Rental Units,
Mainly for Middle Class, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1985 (stating that Zarin built the first pri-
vate rental apartments in twenty years in Atlantic City's depressed Inlet section); Sonny
Schwartz, City Honors A.C.'s Housing Pioneer, ATLANTC Crr PRESS, Nov. 4, 1987 (dis-
cussing "the man who has pioneered Atlantic City's housing revitalization").
31. See, e.g., Casino Is Accused by Man it Had Sued, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1980, at B2;
Richard Haitch, Follow-Up on the News; High Rolling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1982, at 41;
NJ. Man Sues Resorts Intl. for Letting Him Run up Debt, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1980, at 37;
Resorts, Developer Trade Suits over Dice Debts, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS, Dec. 10, 1980;
Brett Skakun, Developer Charged with $4.3M. Casino Credit Fraud, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS,
May 8, 1981; Louis Toscano, Resorts, Zarin Settle $3.5 M. Debt, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS,
Oct. 7, 1981.
32. See Complaint at 3, Resorts Int'l Hotel Casino, Inc. v. Zarin, No. L-14602-80 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Atd. City Div. 1980).
33. See Skakun, supra note 31.
34. See id.; Resorts, Developer Trade Suits over Dice Debts, supra note 31. The Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1997),
permits suits for treble damages plus attorneys' fees by any person injured by, among other
things, a pattern of collection of unlawful debt. Unlawful debt, for this purpose, includes
"a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law
of... a State... and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling
in violation of the law of . . a State . I..." Id  § 1961(6).
35. Daniel Heneghan, Resorts Contests Charges of Credit Violations, ATLANTIC CITY
PRESS, May 13, 1981; Toscano, supra note 31.
36. See Final Order, N.J. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., N.J. Casino Control Commission
Docket No. 81-19 (1983).
37. See Stipulation, supra note 1, at 4, Exhibit 3-C, Notice of Deficiency, David Zarin,
Tax Years 1980 & 1981.
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Zarin responded to all three adversaries-the district attorney, Re-
sorts, and the IRS-by pointing out that at no time had he intended to
defraud anyone. He had always paid his gambling debts before, more
than $2.5 million worth.38 During the heat of his gambling compulsion he
had simply become unaware of their amount.39 If anything, he was a vic-
tim, not a wrong-doer.
On the facts, Zarin appears to have had much the stronger case.40 The
criminal charges were dropped by the district attorney. Resorts settled
for a small fraction of its claim. This left the only IRS, which now found
itself in need of a new theory. If Zarin could prove that he had always
intended to pay his debts but had simply become unaware of their
amount, existing law required a judgment in his favor on the income-by-
theft claim; such law appeared to hold that the $3,435,000 should be
treated as debt to be repaid at some future date, not as income.41
As fate would have it, Zarin had other tax problems in both 1980 and
1981, arising primarily out of his real estate activities. These non-gam-
bling issues remained unresolved when time came to take the asserted
1980 income-by-theft deficiency to court. As a result, Zarin's counsel
made the unfortunate decision to combine both years in a single Tax
Court petition. The non-gambling issues were ultimately settled; the con-
sequence of the single petition, however, was to leave 1981 open and
before the court. This allowed the IRS, on August 25, 1986, five years
after the fact, to assert for the first time that Zarin had "realized income
in the year 1981 in the amount of $2,935,000 through cancellation of
indebtedness. 42
There was a third argument-probably a winner-that the IRS could
have made but did not. In 1980, as now, for regular tax purposes gam-
38. See Stipulation, supra note 1, at 3, 8 (stating that Zarin paid $50,000 of gambling
debt in mid-1970s, $10,000 of gambling debt in late 1970s, $2,500,000 of gambling debt
between June 1978 and December 1979).
39. See id. at 11.
40. In addition to Zarin's history of repayment of gambling debts, see supra note 38,
Zarin's actions after the casino cut off his credit evidenced an intention to repay. The
following day he requested an appointment with the CEO of Resorts "to work out the
method for paying off [his] obligations." Stipulation, supra note 1, at 13. The following
week, they met. "[Tihe amount of the debt was not yet known but Zarin assured Davis
that Resorts would be fully paid." Id. Zarin provided his personal and business financial
statements to facilitate negotiation of a work-out schedule. Id. Zarin's answer to Resorts's
state court complaint, denying liability for the asserted debts, was not filed until March 4,
1981. See Answer, Resorts Int'l Hotel Casino, Inc. v. Zarin, No. L-14602-80 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ati. City Div. 1980).
41. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961) (finding that "[w]hen a
taxpayer acquires earnings . . . without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of
an obligation to repay and without restriction as to their disposition" he is required to
report such earnings as income); Liddy v. Comm'r, 808 F.2d 312, 314 (4th Cir. 1986) (stat-
ing that "[o]nly if the taxpayer can show that he has no claim of right by reason of a
requirement to make prompt payments of amounts received even if such payments are
made in the absence of an enforceable obligation . . . is the receipt of monies not deemed
gross income").
42. Answer at 2, Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084 (1989) (No. 21371-86).
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bling losses could be deducted to the extent of gambling winnings. 43 In
other words, the regular income tax was imposed solely on a gambler's
net winnings. For alternative minimum tax ("AMT") purposes, however,
gross gambling winnings were includible in income but gambling losses
were not deductible by recreational gamblers to the extent they exceeded
sixty percent of a modified form of adjusted gross income ("AGI").44
The AMT, in effect, was imposed in part on a recreational gambler's
gross winnings. Based on the available evidence, an expert might have
estimated Zarin's gross 1980 winnings to have been roughly $61.9 mil-
lion.45 Had the IRS chosen to make this argument, it could have claimed
that Zarin owed roughly $6.2 million in back taxes for 1980, plus interest
and penalties. On the law, it might well have won.
We can only speculate why the IRS failed to make the argument.
There are hints in Zarin's protest to the IRS Appeals Division, filed
before the case went to Tax Court, that it considered doing so.46 The
requisite IRS gambling statistical expert may not have been consulted.
Or the IRS may have viewed the AMT rules, thus applied, as extreme
43. See I.R.C. § 165(d) (1980); Treas. Reg. §1.165-10 (1960).
44. I.R.C. § 55(a) imposed an AMT on alternative minimum taxable income, which
was computed by adding back tax preference items for adjusted itemized deductions and
capital gains. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1). I.R.C. § 57(b)(1) defined "adjusted itemized deduc-
tions" as the amount by which itemized deductions other than those for state and local
taxes, medical and dental expenses, personal casualty losses, and estate taxes ("nonprefer-
ence deductions") exceeded sixty percent of AGI reduced by nonpreference deductions.
Zarin's gambling losses were itemized deductions to the extent that they exceeded sixty
percent of AGI reduced by nonpreference deductions, therefore they constituted tax pref-
erence items subject to the AMT. Had Zarin been engaged in the trade or business of
gambling, the losses would not have been itemized deductions at all, and therefore would
not have been subject to the AMT. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 23 (1986). In
1982, the AMT rules were changed to eliminate wagering losses as a tax preference item.
See I.R.C. §§ 55-56 (1982).
45. Particular bets at craps have house advantages ranging from 1.402% to 16.667%.
In combined bets, the lowest house advantage in a single odds craps game is .8%; in a
double odds game it is .6%. See, e.g., AVERY CARDOZA, How TO WIN AT GAMBLING 92
(1994); EDWIN SILBERSTANG, HOW TO GAMBLE AND WIN 52 (1979). It has been estimated
that the average house advantage in craps is 2.7%. See ABT ET AL., supra note 27, at 227-
28. Given total net losses of $3,435,000, and assuming that Zarin faced average odds and
had average luck, his total bets over the period can be computed to have been about
$127,222,222, and his gross winnings about $61,893,611. [Total bets = net losses / house
advantage. Gross winnings = (.5 - (house advantage / 2)) x net loss / house advantage.]
Interestingly, this computation suggests that Stipulation may have overstated the inten-
sity of Zarin's gambling. It has been estimated that dice are rolled as often as 200 times an
hour at a well-run craps table. See TOM AINSLIE, How TO GAMBLE IN A CASINO 83 (1979).
Assuming that Zarin gambled for 119 days for an average of 14 hours per day and 120 rolls
per hour, over the four-month period he would have made about 200,000 rolls. If he actu-
ally bet $15,000 per roll, his total bets over the period would have been about $3 billion,
over twenty-three times the same figure computed on the basis of his net losses, assuming
that he faced average odds. It is possible, of course, that he did not gamble every day, that
he took off time for other activities even on days on which he did gamble, that the house
maximum was often substantially lower than $15,000 per roll, and that he bet less than the
house maximum on most rolls. On the other hand, it is also possible that he, on average,
accepted worse than average odds.
46. See Protest at 33-37, Exhibit A, In re David Zarin Taxable Years 1980 & 1981,
Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration, Zarin v. Comm'r, 92
T.C. 1084 (1989) (No. 21371-86).
2006] 1767
SMU LAW REVIEW
and worried that courts would strain to interpret them as narrowly as
possible. 47
In any event, the claim the IRS finally chose to pursue was the 1981
debt discharge claim. Had the case begun with a policy decision to at-
tempt to establish that discharges of gambling debt are taxable, Zarin
might not have been the best test case. As it happened, the IRS's ambiv-
alence as to how to proceed placed it at a procedural disadvantage.
B. THE CREATION OF FACTS
Once an issue is joined, the next major step in most lawsuits is fact-
finding. In theory, facts are facts and law is law. Facts are found by the
trial court and may not be disturbed on review unless they are clearly
erroneous. In Zarin, all of the facts were stipulated. 48 In the Tax Court,
parties are required, wherever possible, to stipulate with respect to both
evidentiary facts and the application of law to facts.49 Such a stipulation
is treated as a conclusive admission by the parties,50 except to the extent
the stipulation is contrary to statute. 51 In a stipulated case there is very
little fact-finding for a trial court to do, except perhaps to draw
inferences.
Theory and practice, however, often diverge. A neat demarcation be-
tween fact and law is easier to maintain when the law is clear. When the
law is unclear, the line becomes foggy. Counsel may omit facts that are
ultimately deemed relevant, the stipulation may be ambiguous in critical
regards, and the court itself may be reluctant to accept the parties' stipu-
lations, notwithstanding its own rules. All of these problems arose in
Zarin.
Among the issues as to which the Zarin stipulation was silent or ambig-
uous were: (1) whether Zarin's "debt" to Resorts was enforceable as a
47. The Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit had both recently limited the scope of the
AMT rules as applied to gambling losses. Groetzinger v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 793, 795 (1984),
affd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
48. See generally Stipulation, supra note 1. The Stipulation consisted of a series of
factual recitals, most of which also appeared in the Tax Court's factual findings, plus four-
teen attached exhibits: (1) Zarin's 1980 tax return, (2) Zarin's 1981 tax return, (3) the IRS's
notice of deficiency for 1980 and 1981, (4) excerpts from Staff Policy Group on Casino
Gambling, Second Interim Report (Feb. 17, 1977), (5) Zarin's credit application, (6) a sam-
ple marker, (7) Resort's records of Zarin's credit transactions, consisting of ninety-four
often illegible pages, (8) the Complaint in N.J. Division of Gaming Enforcement v. Resorts
Int'l Hotel, Inc., Docket No. 81-19 (N.J. Casino Control Comm.), (9) an Emergency Order
issued by the Casino Control Commission in that case, (10) the Complaint in Resorts Int'l
Hotel, Inc. v. Zarin, Docket No. L-14602-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Atl. Cty Div. 1980), (11) the
Answer in the foregoing case, (12) the Settlement and Security Agreement between Zarin
and Resorts settling the foregoing case and Zarin v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., No. 80-3972
(D.N.J. 1980), (13) the Final Order in N.J. Division of Gaming Enforcement v. Resorts
Int'l Hotel, Inc., No. 81-19 (N.J. Casino Control Comm. 1983), and (14) psychiatric reports
on Zarin's compulsive gambling behavior by Drs. Robert T. Latimer and Robert L. Custer.
49. See TAX CT. R. 91(a)(1).
50. See id. 91(e).
51. See Ohio Clover Leaf Dairy Co. v. Comm'r, 8 B.T.A. 1249, 1255 (1927); HAROLD
DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 278 (1979).
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matter of New Jersey law, (2) the value of the chips or other goods or
services received by Zarin in exchange for his debt, and (3) whether
Zarin was solvent at the time of the asserted debt discharge.
1. Enforceability
Because casino gambling was new to New Jersey, state law governing
the enforceability of casino debts was not well-settled. In addition, the
relevant credit records were tortuous and often illegible. The principal
evidence that Zarin had "borrowed" $3,435,000 was that he had given an
unspecified number of checks or markers totaling that amount to Resorts
between April 17 and April 29, 1980.52 Exactly how these late April
checks related to his four months of gambling was unclear. As of April
29, Zarin's credit reference card itself reflected an outstanding balance of
only $305,000. In separate litigation before the Casino Control Commis-
sion, Resorts itself ultimately admitted to violating New Jersey law on
thirteen occasions in extending credit to Zarin during the first four
months of 1980. Which, if any, of the various checks and markers in-
volved in the tax litigation were also involved in those violations, how-
ever, was unclear.
The Tax Court therefore resolved the enforceability issue by appealing
to the IRS's burden of proof. In the ordinary tax case, the burden lies
with taxpayer; factual omissions are resolved in the IRS's favor.53 In
Zarin, however, because the IRS had chosen to pursue a different claim
at trial than that specified in its notice of deficiency, the burden of proof
on the debt discharge claim lay with the IRS. 54 On this basis, and this
basis alone, the Tax Court found that Zarin's debt was unenforceable. 55
Had the IRS asserted the 1981 debt discharge claim in its notice of defi-
ciency, the burden of proof would have rested on Zarin. It is unclear how
the Tax Court would then have resolved the enforceability issue.
52. Whether a stipulation that Zarin had written checks to Resorts was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case that he owed that same amount to Resorts is a more difficult
question than one might expect. Since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 3 generally imposes secondary liability on the part of the drawer of a check if the
bank on which the check is drawn fails to honor it. Because New Jersey gaming laws
severely restricted the transfer of checks given for gambling credit, however, Article 3 of
the UCC was held not apply to such checks. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc. v. Salomone, 178 N.J.
Super. 598, 604-05 (1980). Therefore, such checks are subject to pre-UCC law. Prior to
adoption of the UCC, New Jersey recognized a rebuttable presumption, applicable when a
check was introduced as evidence of an underlying debt, that the drawer of the check was
indebted to the payee at the time he gave it. See Bunting v. Allen, 18 N.J.L. 299, 300
(1841). Rule 302 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, made applicable by Tax Court Rule
143, provides that the same presumption will apply in the Tax Court with respect to facts
that are elements of a claim as to which state law supplies the rule of decision. Whether
the existence of a "debt" for purposes of the debt discharge doctrine is a question of state
law, however, is not clear and may turn on whether one adopts a "net worth" or "loan
proceeds" theory of that doctrine. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
53. TAx CT. R. 142(a).
54. See Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1088-89 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 916
F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990); TAx CT. R. 142(a).
55. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1090.
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Why is this important? A rule of law must work in practice, not merely
in theory. In a suit to enforce checks and markers, a casino may eventu-
ally be able to prove liability on the basis of its own hastily scrawled
credit reference cards. For the gambler or the IRS, however, the eviden-
tiary problems are enormous. As a result, if the tax consequences of a
discharge of casino gambling debt are made to turn on enforceability, the
outcome in cases like Zarin may effectively be determined by reference
to which party bears the burden of proof. Such a rule would be pro-
foundly unsatisfactory. One can imagine cases in which the casino con-
cedes the substantive dispute because it cannot prove enforceability, but
the gambler loses the subsequent tax case because he cannot prove unen-
forceability-all with respect to the same debt. Any rule structure, how-
ever theoretically sound, that ignores such evidentiary problems is
unlikely to command long-term respect.
One might be tempted to suggest that the court could have inferred
unenforceability from the fact of the settlement itself. After all, one
might argue, why else would Resorts have relinquished a claim to $2.935
million? There are at least two problems with this solution.
The first problem is legal. The IRS is not bound either by a judgment
in the court hearing the substantive dispute or by a settlement in lieu of
judgment, because it is not party to the substantive proceeding.56 A less
binding approach might be to treat the substantive judgment or settle-
ment as prima facie evidence of whatever it holds or states, shifting the
burden of going forward to the IRS. Courts, however, have not yet
adopted such a rule. 57 Currently, the burden remains on taxpayer to
prove de novo what was already proved (or was to be proved) in the
substantive proceeding.
The second problem is practical. We may guess that Resorts settled
because it concluded that its claim was unenforceable, but in fact it may
have settled for other reasons. Zarin's answer in state court, for example,
asserted inter alia that there was no debt, enforceable or otherwise, be-
cause Resorts had never intended that any amount owed by Zarin be
collectible or collected. 58 Alternatively, he asserted that the debt had
been repaid in part or in full.59 Resorts' willingness to settle might
56. See generally GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FED-
ERAL CIVIL TAX CONTROVERSIES § 22.03 (1996) (discussing collateral estoppel in Tax
Court litigation).
57. In limited circumstances, a showing by taxpayer that the Commissioner's determi-
nation was arbitrary or erroneous operates to shift the burden of going forward to the
Commissioner. See, e.g., Moretti v. Comm'r, 77 F.3d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1996); Demkowicz v.
Comm'r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally Sean M. Moran, Note, The Pre-
sumption of Correctness: Should the Commissioner Be Required to Carry the Initial Burden
of Production, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1087 (1987); Christina Potter Moraski, Proving a Neg-
ative- When the Taxpayer Denies Receipt, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 141 (1984).
58. Answer at 6, Resorts Int'l Hotel Casino, Inc. v. Zarin, No. L-14602-80 (N.J. Super.




equally be construed as a recognition of the validity of one of these
claims-with different tax consequences.
2. Value
Another set of problems was raised by the issue of how much value
Zarin received in exchange for his $3,435,000 in checks. Value is nor-
mally a question of fact.60 The Stipulation, however, was silent as to
value. The Tax Court, therefore, had three options: it could (1) invoke
the burden of proof and hold against the IRS, (2) infer a value from the
stipulated facts, or (3) assign a value as a matter of law. The court de-
clined to invoke the burden of proof. Whether it inferred a value from
the stipulated facts or assigned one as a matter of law was not clear.
In form, the case proceeded on the assumption that the checks had
been issued for chips-not, for example, for cash or hotel accommoda-
tions. What are chips? The Stipulation stated that "chips are property
which are not negotiable and may not be used to gamble or for any other
purpose outside the casino where they were issued. ''61 Apart from this
stipulation, the Tax Court had no further guidance; it relied instead on its
own understanding of how casinos operate. On this basis, it assumed that
Zarin could have redeemed his chips dollar-for-dollar for cash.62 It there-
fore concluded that the actual value of Zarin's chips exactly equaled their
face value-3,435,000. 63
Unfortunately, the court's key assumption was wrong. New Jersey law
prohibited the redemption of a credit gambler's chips for cash or their
removal from the casino, requiring that they first be applied against the
gambler's outstanding credit balance.64 In effect, the only thing Zarin
could have done with his chips was to pay down his unenforceable debt.
On this basis, the Third Circuit concluded that the chips had no "indepen-
dent economic value beyond the casino" 65-indeed, that they had "no
economic substance. ' 66 Whether it so held as a matter of law or because
it believed that the Tax Court was clearly erroneous on the facts was
again not clear.
60. See, e.g., Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 37, 40 (1937); Anselmo v.
Comm'r, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 1985); Ellstrom v. Comm'r 235 F.2d 181, 181 (6th
Cir. 1956); Tex.-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 326, 327-28 (10th Cir. 1944);
Anchor Co. v. Comm'r, 42 F.2d 99, 100 (4th Cir. 1930).
61. Stipulation, supra note 1, at 4.
62. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1092 (1989) (finding that "theoretically petitioner
could have redeemed the chips for cash"), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1990).
63. See id. at 1100 (stating that "[f]oreign currency fluctuates in United States dollar
value, whereas the chips in question do not").
64. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:45-1.24(s) (1979) (providing that "[tihe casino licensee
shall require patrons to apply any chips ... in their possession in reduction of personal
checks or [markers] exchanged for purposes of gaming prior to exchanging such chips...
for cash ... or prior to departing from the casino area").




The Tax Court majority, however, further found or held that in actual-
ity, Zarin had not purchased chips at all:
[Zarin] bargained for and received the opportunity to gamble and
incidental services, lodging, entertainment, meals, and transporta-
tion. Petitioner's argument that he was purchasing chips ignores the
essence of the transaction .... As a matter of substance, chips in
isolation are not what petitioner purchased. 67
Unfortunately, there was no stipulation as to the value of any of these
services, which, unlike chips, are not issued in dollar denominations.68
The only evidence of their value was the fact that Zarin had "paid"
$3,435,000 for them. It is not clear whether the Tax Court valued the
chips, the services, or both together. In any event, the court either in-
ferred the value of whatever Zarin received from the amount he paid or
held that amount to be its value as a matter of law.
A colorable argument can be made in support of such an inference or
holding. "Fair market value" is formally defined, for tax purposes, as the
price for which property would change hands between a willing buyer and
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.69 Nevertheless,
in an arm's-length sale between unrelated parties the value of an item is
almost always determined by reference to the price actually paid.70
There were, however, at least three problems with the application of
these rules to the Zarin facts. First, it was stipulated that Zarin was acting
under compulsion 71 and that he had no knowledge of the amount he was
paying 72-a "relevant fact" within the meaning of the formal definition of
fair market value. Second, the rule that the value of an item is deter-
mined by reference to the price actually paid was not designed to apply to
the valuation of an "opportunity to gamble." It may be plausible to infer
that someone who has paid $3.435 million for a painting has received
$3.435 million of value. It is far less plausible to infer that someone who
has just lost $3.435 million on a bet has received equal value.
67. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1099.
68. Resorts estimated that the value of the incidental services, lodging, entertainment,
meals, and transportation given to Zarin was $180,000. See Skakun, supra note 31. This
value, however, was not in evidence in the Tax Court litigation.
69. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973); Willow Terrance Dev. Co. v.
Comm'r, 345 F.2d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(2)-1(c)(1) (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.897-
1(o)2(ii) (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.1445-1(f)(7) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1958); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(a) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1
(1958); Treas. Reg. § 2512-3(a) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(c)(1) (1960); Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3121(i)-4 Example (1) (1954).
70. See Husted v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 664, 673 (1967); Hunley v. Comm'r, 25 T.C.M.
(CCH) 355, 355 (1966); Pellar v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 299, 309 (1955); Palmer v. Comm'r, 302
U.S. 63, 67 (1937).
71. See Stipulation, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that "Zarin was at that time possessed
by the compulsion to continue gambling").
72. See id. (stating that "Zarin was not aware of the amount of his gambling debts.");
id. at 13 (stating that in early May 1980, "the amount of the debt was not yet known").
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Most importantly, however, the rule simply cannot be used to measure
value for debt discharge purposes. When purchase money debt is par-
tially discharged, we must decide which price-original or adjusted-
should be deemed to represent the value of the item for tax purposes. If
the original price is the item's deemed value, then the discharge will re-
present income. If, however, the adjusted price is the item's deemed
value, then the discharge merely brings the price actually paid into line
with the item's deemed value. The fact that taxpayer originally agrees to
pay $3.435 million does not by itself resolve the question. Rather, we
need extrinsic evidence of value.
The strongest argument in favor of the Tax Court majority's valuation
was that Zarin received the same value that a gambler who had lost
$3.435 million of his own money would have received. This may be true,
but it does not follow that either gambler (or, indeed, a neutral observer)
would necessarily conclude, after the fact, that he received $3.435 million
worth of anything. I will discuss the problem of value further in Part II.C
below.
3. Solvency
Internal Revenue Code § 108(e)(5), 73 the statutory purchase price ad-
justment provision, is available only to solvent taxpayers. Attempting to
invoke this provision, Zarin's trial counsel stated in brief that "[o]n Sep-
tember 28, 1981 when Petitioner settled his debt with Resorts, he was
solvent."'74 There was, however, no stipulation or other evidence to that
effect; and statements in briefs are not evidence. 75 Counsel's assertion
was unfortunate for other reasons as well: (1) Zarin later declared under
oath that he had not authorized the statement,76 (2) he also later filed
affidavits and financial statements to the effect that he was insolvent both
before and after the discharge,77 and (3) insolvent taxpayers are exempt
per se from the recognition of discharge of indebtedness income. 78 (Zarin
also later to sued trial counsel for its handling of the insolvency issue.) 79
Perhaps there are cases in which fact-finding is straightforward. Zarin,
however, was not such a case. When Judge Jacobs stated, in dissent,
"[t]he facts in this case are relatively simple," he was referring to the styl-
ized facts-the facts for which Zarin has come to stand. He was not re-
ferring to reality.
73. All section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as in effect in 1980 and 1981.
74. Brief for Petitioner at 79, Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084 (1989) (No. 21371-86).
75. See TAX Cr. R. 143(b).
76. See Affidavit of David Zarin at 2, Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084 (No. 21371-86).
77. See id. at 1-3; Affidavit of Gordon M. Sandler, Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084 (No. 21371-86)
(Zarin's certified public accountant); Affidavit of Jonathan I. Epstein, Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084
(No. 21371-86) (Zarin's personal and business counsel).
78. I.R.C. § 108(a) (1980).
79. Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 184 A.D.2d 385, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding no
cause of action for legal malpractice because taxpayer ultimately won in the Third Circuit).
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C. THE INDETERMINACY OF RULES
No one who believes that courts merely apply rules to facts would be
able to explain what the authors of the various Zarin opinions thought
they were doing. What judges do (and lawyers try to persuade them to
do) is far more complex, as Zarin richly illustrates.
The rule structure the Tax Court and Third Circuit inherited was com-
plex and ill-defined. The discharge of indebtedness doctrine itself had
been created by the courts, not Congress, in United States v. Kirby Lum-
ber Co.,80 decided in 1931.81 As in Zarin, the actual facts in Kirby Lum-
ber were more complex than those for which the case ultimately came to
stand.8 2 Here I will discuss the latter-the stylized facts. Taxpayer issued
notes for cash; it was later able to repurchase those notes for less than
their face amount. At least on these stylized facts, taxpayer ended up
with more money.83 Therefore, the Supreme Court held, Taxpayer recog-
nized income.
Subsequent cases recognized several possibly relevant exceptions to
this general rule. The first exception applied to insolvent taxpayers:
courts reasoned that the discharge of insolvent taxpayers' debts did not
make them wealthier and therefore concluded that such taxpayers could
not have discharge of indebtedness income.84 Courts also developed an
80. 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
81. The Treasury first attempted to tax debt discharge income by regulatory fiat. Al-
though early regulations only required the inclusion of limited types of such income, see
Treas. Reg. 33, art. 135 (Revenue Act of 1913 Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114); Treas. Reg.
33 (rev. ed.), arts. 149, 150, 152 (Revenue Acts of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756,
and 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-70, 40 Stat. 300), the 1918 regulations took the position that debt
discharges generally resulted in income. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 544 (Revenue Act of 1918,
Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057). The issue initially had a mixed reception in the courts.
In United States v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211, 213 (2d Cir.
1918), the court treated the cancellation of a corporation's debt to its shareholder as a
contribution to capital, not income. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Lynch, 292 F. 903,
906 (D. Minn. 1921), by contrast, the court found income when the taxpayer wrote off
liabilities that had become outlawed. In 1926, however, the Supreme Court decided Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926), which the Board of Tax Appeals inter-
preted to hold that debt discharges did not trigger income. See, e.g., Senner v. Comm'r, 22
B.T.A. 655 (1931); Houghton & Dutton Bldg. Trust v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 591, 593 (1930);
Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Comm'r, 3 B.T.A. 1319, 1321-22 (1926); Indep. Brewing Co. v.
Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 870, 872-73 (1926). A more extensive discussion of Kerbaugh-Empire
appears in Seto, supra note 26, at 208-10. The issue was finally resolved in Kirby Lumber.
82. See Boris I. Bittker, Income from the Cancellation of Indebtedness: A Historical
Footnote to the Kirby Lumber Co. Case, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 124 (1977) (explaining that in
Kirby Lumber, the debt was actually issued primarily to redeem preferred stock with ac-
crued but unpaid dividends, not for cash).
83. In point of fact, the Kirby Lumber Company ended up with no extra cash at all.
The true benefit the company obtained through the issuance and repurchase of the bonds
in question was the retirement of outstanding preferred stock for less than its par value
plus accrued dividends. The Supreme Court ignored the more difficult issues presented by
this more complex picture of what had occurred. As I note at the outset of this Article, law
involves simplification. Whether the degree of such simplification is warranted in a given
case is always open to question.
84. See, e.g., Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 622 (1941) (finding that a taxpayer recognizes income to extent debt discharge ren-
ders the taxpayer solvent); Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F.2d
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exception for purchase price adjustments: a discharge of purchase money
debt might, in fact, constitute an adjustment to the price and basis of the
purchased property rather than income.85 One 1939 Board of Tax Ap-
peals case, N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner,86 was interpreted as holding
that the settlement of disputed debts did not result in income-a rule
sometimes known as the disputed debt exception to the doctrine.8 7
Congress intervened sporadically, primarily through the enactment and
repeated amendment of what is now § 108. In 1954, debt discharge in-
come was added to the list of types of gross income in § 61; this addition,
however, seems to have been made for the sake of completeness and had
no apparent substantive effect. 88 Section 108(a), enacted in 1980, re-
placed the judicially-created insolvency exception with new statutory
rules that explicitly superseded prior law. 89 At the same time, Congress
added § 108(e)(5), a statutory purchase price adjustment exception. Un-
like § 108(a), this new exception was not described as exclusive. It appar-
ently supplemented rather than replaced the broader nonstatutory
rules.90
On top of this judicial and statutory pastiche, courts and scholars cre-
ated two competing theoretical rationales for the doctrine. The first,
known as the "net worth" or "freeing of assets" theory, held that a tax-
payer recognized income at the moment of discharge because his or her
net worth was increased by that discharge. The second theory, known as
the "loan proceeds" or "deferred income" theory, focused on the borrow-
ing rather than on the discharge. Borrowing does not result in income, it
95, 96 (5th Cir. 1934) (noting that the discharge of debts of insolvent taxpayer does not
result in recognition of income); F.W. Sickels Co. v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 654, 659 (Ct.
Cl. 1940) (discussing when the IRS first conceded the insolvency exception); Lakeland
Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 289, 291 (1937).
85. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. A.L. Killian
Co., 128 F.2d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1942); Allen v. Courts, 127 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1942);
Hirsch v. Comm'r, 115 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940); Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50
F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Gehring Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 345, 354 (1942). See also
Helvering v. Am. Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1943) (stating that "[w]here the indebt-
edness has represented the purchase price of property, a partial forgiveness has been
treated as a readjustment of the contract rather than a gain").
86. 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939).
87. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
COME, ESTATES & GIFrs 9 6.4.2 (2d ed. 1989); David J. Blattner, Jr., Debt Cancellation,
30Tm ANN. N.Y.U. INST. 237, 253; James S. Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the
Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225, 237 (1959):
Victoria Powell, A Review of Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule, 30 U. FLA. L.
REV. 94, 120 (1977).
88. A proposal by the House of Representatives to add a new Code § 72 to clarify and
define the doctrine, see H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at 12 (1954), was rejected by the Senate
and therefore did not make it into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as finally enacted.
See H.R. Rep. No. 83-2543, at 23 (1954); Hearing on H.R. 8300 Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 83d Cong. 624-26 (1954) (statement of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York) (opposing statutory clarification and recommending continued case law
elaboration).
89. I.R.C. § 108(e)(1) (1980) (finding that there is no insolvency exception except as
provided in IRC § 108(a)).
90. See Seto, supra note 26, at 266-70.
2006] Inside Zarin 1775
SMU LAW REVIEW
argued, because of an assumption that the loan will be repaid; when this
assumption proves false-for example, when the debt is discharged with-
out repayment-a taxpayer must recognize the income he or she would
otherwise have recognized at the moment of borrowing.
At the trial level, Zarin invoked the net worth theory. His alleged debt
to Resorts, he argued, was unenforceable from the outset as a matter of
state law. Its discharge, therefore, had no effect whatsoever on his net
worth and could not result in debt discharge income. 91 In addition, he
invoked two exceptions to the doctrine. First, he argued that his alleged
debt to Resorts was disputed, and therefore exempt under the disputed
debt exception. 92 Second, he argued that the settlement was exempt
under § 108(e)(5), the statutory purchase price adjustment exception.93
Finally, Zarin argued that he ought to be allowed to use his 1980 gam-
bling losses to offset any 1981 income recognized by reason of the dis-
charge, an argument which was flatly inconsistent with the governing
regulations and which he did not thereafter seriously pursue.94 Zarin did
not initially argue insolvency, nor did he attempt to invoke the nonstatu-
tory purchase price adjustment rules.
The IRS, by contrast, argued the loan proceeds theory. Zarin was not
required to include the borrowed $3,435,000 in income at the time of bor-
rowing because it was assumed that the same amount would be repaid.
When that assumption proved false in 1981, the IRS argued, Zarin should
be required to report the unrepaid loan proceeds-$2,935,000-as in-
come. Under the loan proceeds theory, in other words, enforceability
was irrelevant. 95 The disputed debt exception, the IRS argued further,
applied merely to disputes about contract liability;96 § 108, it asserted,
was limited to trade or business debt,97 and there was no provision al-
lowing the carryover of Zarin's 1980 losses to offset any 1981 income.98
1. The Tax Court Majority
The Tax Court majority agreed with the IRS on all major points, al-
though often for different reasons. With respect to enforceability, it
reasoned:
91. See Opening Brief for Petitioner at 62-63, Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084 (1989)
(No. 21371-86).
92. See id. at 40-44.
93. See id. at 77-79.
94. See id. at 83-84. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 provides that losses on wagering transac-
tions can be deducted only to the extent of gain during the same taxable year from such
wagering transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 (1960).
95. See Brief for Respondent at 15-25, Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084 (No. 21371-86).
96. See id. at 21.
97. See Reply Brief for Respondent at 13, Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084 (No. 21371-86). For this
proposition, the IRS cited Treas. Reg. §1.108(a)-i, which spoke only to the applicability of
I.R.C. § 108(a), dated from 1956, and had not been amended to reflect any changes in the
statute since that date.
98. See Reply Brief for Respondent at 14a, Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084 (No. 21371-86).
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In the instant case, symmetry from year to year is not accomplished
unless we treat petitioner's receipt of the loan from Resorts ... and
the subsequent discharge of his obligation to repay that loan in a
consistent manner. Petitioner received credit of $3,435,000 from Re-
sorts. He treated these amounts as a loan, not reporting any income
on his 1980 tax return.99
Therefore, it concluded, he should be required to treat the loan, although
unenforceable, as debt for debt discharge purposes as well. 100
Zarin's other arguments fared no better. The disputed debt exception,
the court suggested, applied only to unliquidated debts; Zarin's debt was
liquidated.101 Section 108(e)(5) was inapplicable for two reasons. First,
in substance Zarin had purchased "the opportunity to gamble and inci-
dental services, lodging, entertainment, meals, and transportation,"
which, the court said, did not constitute "normal commercial property"'10 2
covered by that section. Second, the court found that chips could not
fluctuate in value, implying that § 108(e)(5) applied only to property sus-
ceptible to such value fluctuation. 10 3 Finally, the court held that Zarin's
gambling losses could not offset his debt discharge income because (1)
the losses were incurred in 1980 and the income in 1981, and (2) the debt
discharge income was not a gain from "wagering transactions" within the
meaning of § 165(d), which limits the deduction of wagering losses to
such gains, even within the same year.104
The majority's conclusions that a discharge of unenforceable gambling
debt was taxable and that the disputed debt exception only applied to
unliquidated debt were both contrary to precedent-albeit skimpy prece-
dent.10 5 Its reading of § 108(e)(5), as Judge Ruwe's dissenting opinion
would demonstrate, violated conventional canons of statutory construc-
tion. Only its refusal to allow Zarin to apply his gambling losses against
his debt discharge income seemed uncontroversial. What did the major-
ity think it was doing?
Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars are constantly driven to explain.
Perhaps as a result, larger theories often come to underlie more concrete
rules, whether statutory or judicial. As theories evolve, they sometimes
come into conflict with parts of the very rules they were created to ex-
plain. The lure of theory is powerful indeed. In Zarin, theory suggested
that the taxpayer had received taxable consumption value. The Tax
Court majority clearly wanted to construe the debt discharge rules in a
manner consistent with theory and was willing to disregard at least some
precedent to do so.
99. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1092.
100. Id. at 1095.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1099.
103. Id. 1097, 1100.
104. Id. at 1096.
105. See United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir. 1962) (finding that discharge
of unenforceable gambling debt not income); N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 1263,
1265 (1939) (providing that settlement of disputed debt not income).
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I will discuss theory at greater length in Part II of this Article. Here, I
want to focus on a more technical question: In attempting to conform law
to theory, just how much precedent did the Tax Court majority disregard?
One of the functions of a good opinion is to resolve the issues presented,
preferably in the "right" way, while doing minimum violence to existing
law-to weave its logic, to the extent possible, within the existing legal
fabric. Perhaps the single greatest failing of the majority opinion was its
failure to appreciate the collateral implications of its logic.
I have suggested that, in the casino context, unenforceability may be
difficult to prove. Nevertheless, from a precedential perspective, one of
the key questions in Zarin was whether the debt discharge rules should
be extended to unenforceable debt. No court had ever done so. Indeed,
no court had ever treated an unenforceable obligation as "debt" for any
other tax purpose. Interest paid on unenforceable debt was not deducti-
ble. 106 A bad debt deduction was allowable only with respect to enforce-
able debt.107 Payment of an unenforceable obligation was not deductible
as a tax under § 164,108 a loss under § 165,109 or a restoration of an item
previously included under claim of right under § 1341.110 In holding that
consistency required Zarin's unenforceable obligation to be treated as
"debt" for debt discharge purposes, the Tax Court necessarily implied
that it should be treated as debt for other purposes as well.111 The impli-
106. See, e.g., Autenreith v. Comm'r, 115 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 82-78,
1982-1 C.B. 30 (providing that "[a]n indebtedness, for purposes of § 163, is an uncondi-
tional and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of money"); Rev. Rul. 78-29,
1978-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 77-417, 1977-2 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58, 59; Rev.
Rul. 74-592, 1974-2 C.B. 48.
107. See Comm'r v. McKay Prods. Corp., 178 F.2d 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. dis-
missed, 339 U.S. 961 (1950); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) (as amended in 1986) (providing that
"[a] bona fide debt is a debt which arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a
valid and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money"). The
latter regulation was amended in 1983, after the IRS's victories in Flamingo Resort, Inc. v.
United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982), and
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Comm'r, 698 F.2d 1229, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
816 (1983), to provide:
A debt arising out of the receivables of an accrual method taxpayer is
deemed to be an enforceable obligation for purposes of the preceding sen-
tence to the extent that the income such debt represents have been included
in the return of income for the year for which the deduction as a bad debt is
claimed or for a prior taxable year. For example, a debt arising out of gam-
bling receivables that are unenforceable under state or local law, which an
accrual method taxpayer includes in income under section 61, is an enforcea-
ble obligation for purposes of this paragraph.
Treas. Reg. § 1.66-1(c) (as amended by T.D. 7902, 1983-2 C.B. 45). This was and still is, to
my knowledge, the only exception to the general rule that debt must be enforceable to be
treated as "debt" for tax purposes.
108. See Cooperstown Corp. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 772 (1944).
109. See Murphree v. United States, 867 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1989); Comm'r v. Gilt
Edge Textile Corp., 173 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul. 78-141, 1978-1 C.B. 58; Rev.
Rul. 62-14, 1962-1 C.B. 11.
110. See Kappel v. United States, 437 F.2d 1222, 1226 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 830 (1971).
111. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1092 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 110
(3d Cir. 1990).
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cations were potentially far-reaching.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. After incurring his
"debt" but before settling it, Zarin incorporates his gambling business. In
the transaction, the new corporation assumes the "liability."' a" 2 If the "li-
ability" assumed exceeds the basis of any property contributed, we must
decide whether Zarin recognizes gain under § 357(c). 1 1 3 If the answer is
no-that is, if we are unwilling to treat unenforceable debt as a "liability"
for purposes of the corporate nonrecognition rules-circumvention of the
Tax Court majority's holding becomes trivial.114 If, on the other hand,
unenforceable purchase money debt is a "liability" for purposes of
§ 357(c), consistency requires that Zarin also be allowed basis for that
"liability."115 Do we really believe that Commissioner v. Tufts"1 6 should
be so extended? Must we also then be willing to discard Estate of Frank-
lin v. Commissioner?117
The point here is not that the Tax Court majority was "wrong," nor
even that its opinion causes problems in the interpretation of § 357(c).
That section is merely one of many for which the definition of debt is
crucial. The point is rather that the opinion's logic is not easily limited to
the discharge of unenforceable debts. The premise that debt must be en-
forceable to be "debt" is fundamental to our current tax system; changes
in fundamental rules are hard to limit to particular contexts.
Even more fundamental are the basic accounting rules. To some, the
term "accounting" evokes images of bare light bulbs and green
eyeshades. Accounting rules, however, are the lifeblood of any financial
system, and a court construing the Internal Revenue Code ignores them
at its peril. Here, again, the Tax Court did inadvertent violence to ex-
isting law.
At the heart of the majority opinion was an appeal to accounting con-
sistency-"symmetry," the court called it. 118 The court's real concern, as
112. Readers uncomfortable with the notion of incorporating a gambling business may
apply the discussion in text to the following hypothetical, which raises the same issues.
Zarin acquires real estate in exchange for debt that is unenforceable ab initio as a matter of
state law, perhaps because it is usurious. He then incorporates his real estate activities.
113. Section 351 provides nonrecognition treatment to a taxpayer who exchanges prop-
erty solely for stock of a corporation and ends up in control of the corporation immediately
after the exchange. I.R.C. § 351 (West 2006). Section 357(c) then provides that such a
taxpayer will nevertheless recognize gain to the extent that any liabilities assumed the cor-
poration in the transaction exceed the basis of any property contributed. Id. § 357(c).
114. I leave this problem as an exercise for the student.
115. Assume, for example, that Zarin incorporates after obtaining the chips for unen-
forceable debt but before he loses them at craps. The new corporation takes the chips and
assumes the "debt." Unless Zarin gets basis in those chips for that unenforceable debt,
§ 357(c) will trigger gain where it clearly should not.
116. 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (discussing that a taxpayer obtains basis in property for
nonrecourse purchase money debt).
117. 544 F.2d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that debt is not debt if it "has eco-
nomic significance only if the property substantially appreciates in value prior to the date
at which a very large portion of the purchase price is to be discharged").
118. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1092 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 110
(3d Cir. 1990).
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I have noted, was the correct measurement of income; the court con-
cluded that Zarin had received consumption value without paying for it
and used the debt discharge rules to tax him on that value.1 19 Its argu-
ment, however, was framed in terms of consistency, a conceptually dis-
tinct issue, 120 and it is to this topic that I now turn.
I want to focus particularly on the need for consistency between the
loss recognition rules and the debt discharge rules. The problem is per-
haps more easily explored in a non-gambling context. Assume that Zarin
incurs $3.435 million of fully enforceable debt in 1980 for an ordinary and
necessary business expense deductible under § 162.121 In 1981, that debt
is then discharged for a payment of $500,000. There are two ways to ac-
count consistently for this transaction. First, we might allow a $3.435 mil-
lion deduction in 1980, treat the allowed amount as a liability, and require
the recognition of $2.935 million of income in 1981. Alternatively, we
might prohibit recognition of any expense in 1980. In such event, we
would not require Zarin to recognize debt discharge income in 1981; in-
deed, we would even permit him to take into account a $500,000 expense
when he pays the $500,000 settlement amount. 122
In substance, over the transaction as a whole, Zarin has spent $500,000
on a deductible item. If we account inconsistently for the two events-the
incurring of the debt and the partial discharge-we will mismeasure his
net income over time. For example, if we require recognition of $2.935
million of debt discharge income in 1981, our loss accounting rules must
permit Zarin to take a $3.435 million expense into account in 1980.123
This does not mean that the $3.435 million will necessarily be deductible;
it might, for example, be nondeductible as a bribe or lobbying expense. It
must, however, be taken into account in 1980. Conversely, if our loss ac-
counting rules do not permit Zarin to take a $3.435 million expense into
account in 1980, our debt discharge rules cannot require him to recognize
$2.935 million of income in 1981. This is not because the debt discharge
income is exempt; it is required rather as a matter of accounting
consistency.
The same consistency requirements apply in accounting for consump-
tion. Assume, for example, that Zarin incurs $3.435 million of enforcea-
ble debt for an activity not engaged in for profit (a hobby) in 1980; in
1981 the debt is then settled with a payment of $500,000. If Zarin's
method of accounting takes the $3.435 million expenditure into account
119. Id. at 1094.
120. A set of accounting rules may be internally consistent but fail to correctly measure
income; conversely, a rule of decision may measure income correctly in a given case even
though it is inconsistent with the remainder of the tax system.
121. I.R.C. § 162 (1980).
122. We might also prohibit recognition in 1980, but permit recognition of the full
$3.435 million of expense in 1981, requiring at the same time the recognition of $2.935
million of income. Such a solution has never been permitted, however, under either the
cash or accrual method accounting rules.
123. The consistency problem could also be solved by taking the expense into account
at the moment of debt discharge. Existing accounting rules, however, do not so provide.
1780 [Vol. 59
in 1980, it must also require him to take $2.935 million of debt discharge
income into account in 1981. Conversely, if his accounting method does
not take the expenditure into account until it is paid, it cannot also re-
quire him to account for debt discharge income when payment is
made.124 All this is true even if the hobby expenses turn out to be nonde-
ductible under § 183-applied in the year in which those expenses are
taken into account under Zarin's method of accounting. In our system,
consistent accounting rules are antecedent to and independent of the sub-
stantive rules of inclusion and deduction.
Because the Tax Court concluded that Zarin recognized $2.935 million
of debt discharge income in 1981,125 accounting consistency required that
it also hold that he incurred $3.435 million of losses in 1980-nondeduct-
ible under § 165(d) because he lacked other gambling income in 1980, but
nevertheless to be taken into account in that year.' 2 6 This subsidiary but
necessary holding raised a slew of questions. Does a taxpayer incur a loss
when he incurs a debt? Does it matter whether he uses the cash or ac-
crual method of accounting? Does it matter whether the debt is enforce-
able? Does it matter whether the debt is disputed? Or, to put the
question in its most pointed form: Does a cash method taxpayer incur a
loss when he incurs but does not pay, a disputed, unenforceable debt? Ac-
cording to the Tax Court, the answer was yes. It held that Zarin did incur
a $3.435 million loss in 1980, regardless of whether he used the cash or
accrual method and regardless of whether the debt was enforceable or
disputed.127 And in that holding-necessary both to its conclusion that
the 1980 losses could not offset the 1981 debt discharge income and to its
conclusion that Zarin had debt discharge income at all-lies the account-
ing problem.
It is and has always been fundamental to our tax system that a cash
method taxpayer does not take otherwise deductible amounts into ac-
count until they are actually paid, regardless of whether the obligation to
make payment is disputed or legally enforceable. 128 Whether such
amounts are in fact deductible is then determined by applying the sub-
stantive deductibility rules at the time the expenditures are taken into
account-that is, at the time of payment. For example, if Zarin had in-
curred a debt for hobby expenses in 1980 which he paid in part in 1981,
under the cash method the expense would not be taken into account until
1981, only the amount actually paid would be taken into account, and its
deductibility would then be determined by applying § 183 in that year.
The Zarin Tax Court majority ignored this basic rule.
124. Again, the consistency problem could be solved by taking the full $3.435 million
expense into account at the moment Zarin pays the $500,000, requiring him at the same
time to take into account a $2.935 million debt discharge. Again, existing law does not
authorize this solution.
125. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1085 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 110
(3d Cir. 1990).
126. I.R.C. § 165(d) (1980).
127. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1092.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1999).
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The Zarin Stipulation was silent on whether Zarin used the cash or
accrual method in his gambling activities. What if he was an accrual
method taxpayer? In 1980, an accrual method taxpayer was allowed to
take a liability into account when all events had occurred necessary to
establish the existence of the liability and the amount of the liability
could be determined with reasonable accuracy-the so-called "all events"
test. The effect of enforceability under this rule was not clear. It was
clear, however, that a contested liability was not deductible except to the
extent the taxpayer admitted the liability. Instead, the liability was ig-
nored until the dispute was resolved, at which time the resolution was
treated as establishing the amount of both the deduction and the debt.129
This was true regardless of whether, in form, the liability was liquidated
or unliquidated. The Zarin Tax Court majority ignored this basic rule as
well.
Two exceptions to the basic cash and accrual rules were possibly rele-
vant to the Zarin facts. First, a taxpayer gets basis in property purchased
for debt, even prior to paying off that debt. 130 If the taxpayer then loses
the property in an otherwise deductible manner, he or she is entitled to a
tax loss even prior to paying off the debt.1 31 Use of this exception to
rehabilitate the majority's accounting analysis, however, was problematic
for at least two reasons. First, the court would have needed to hold that a
taxpayer gets basis in property acquired for unenforceable debt. In view
of the tax law's general distrust of unenforceable debt, 132 this would have
been a fairly radical step.
Second, such a holding would have been inconsistent with established
accounting rules for casino chip gambling. At one time, the IRS had ad-
vocated a so-called "two-step" approach to casino chip accounting. 133
Under this approach, the conversion of cash or credit into chips and the
disposition of the chips were treated as separate steps with independent
tax significance. But the Tax Court, the United States District Court for
Nevada, and the Ninth Circuit all rejected the two-step approach, requir-
ing instead an accounting approach that disregarded the conversion of
cash or credit into chips and treated the disposition of the chips as a dis-
position of the underlying cash or credit itself.134 The Zarin Tax Court
majority's conclusion that chips were merely "a medium of exchange"
was therefore fully consistent with existing law-not because chips were
129. See Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
l(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1999). See also I.R.C. § 461(f); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2 (as
amended in 2004) (establishing special procedure to allow accrual method taxpayers to
deduct contested liabilities).
130. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983).
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1977).
132. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
133. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,796 (May 1, 1974) (revoking I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,536 (Oct. 15, 1980)).
134. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 937 (D. Nev. 1980),
affd, 664 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982); Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1033, 1049-50 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
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equivalent to cash, but rather because established accounting rules
treated them as merely representative of whatever had been given to ac-
quire them. 135 To hold that Zarin acquired basis in his chips equal to the
amount of his debt and was therefore entitled to a loss upon the disposi-
tion of those chips would have been to reinstitute the rejected two-step
approach.136
Additional timing rules also apply, however, for liabilities subject to
§ 165, which governs the deduction of losses, including gambling
losses.137 Regardless of whether a taxpayer uses the cash or accrual
method, such losses are taken into account only when "actually sus-
tained. 1 38 Does a taxpayer "actually sustain" a loss when he or she loses
a chip representing an unenforceable and ultimately disputed debt? Con-
cluding that Zarin had sustained his gambling losses in 1980, the Tax
Court majority answered this question in the affirmative. 139 It necessarily
held that incurring an unenforceable and disputed debt constitutes the
sustaining of a loss sufficient to permit a deduction under § 165, if such
loss is otherwise deductible under that section. 140
This was a remarkable holding. Prior law had held that even the actual
payment of an unenforceable debt could not constitute the sustaining of a
loss within the meaning of § 165.141 The Zarin Tax Court majority im-
plied that merely incurring such a debt was sufficient. 142
What of the fact that Zarin's debt was disputed? The deduction of
losses represented by disputed debt had previously been governed by N.
Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, the case that also established the disputed
debt exception to the discharge of indebtedness doctrine. 143 The tax-
payer in that case had purchased stock, giving its seller a note for
$21,700.144 The following year, the taxpayer sued the seller for rescission,
alleging among other things that the note violated state law.' 45 The
seller's successor-in-interest countersued for the principal amount of the
note plus interest. 146 Three years later, the parties settled and the tax-
payer paid the seller $10,850, which it deducted on its federal income tax
return. 147 The IRS disallowed the loss, asserting that the stock had be-
come worthless in an earlier year-in other words, that the taxpayer had
sustained the loss prior to the settlement. 148 In addition, the IRS asserted
135. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1100 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 110
(3d Cir. 1990).
136. See id.
137. I.R.C. § 165.
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.65-1(a) (as amended in 1977).
139. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1096.
140. I.R.C. § 165.
141. See supra note 109.
142. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1099-100.





148. Id. at 1264-65.
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that the taxpayer recognized discharge of indebtedness income equal to
the difference between the face amount of the note and the settlement
amount.149 The Board of Tax Appeals disagreed, holding that the settle-
ment established both (1) the timing and amount of the loss for loss pur-
poses and (2) the amount of the debt for debt discharge purposes.150 In
effect, N. Sobel can be read as acknowledging the need for consistency
between the loss recognition and discharge of indebtedness rules.
The Zarin Tax Court majority apparently overruled the first aspect of
N. Sobel by impliedly holding that a taxpayer whose loss is represented
by a disputed debt-a debt on which the taxpayer continues to deny lia-
bility-is entitled to claim that loss notwithstanding the dispute. It also
limited the second holding of N. Sobel-that the settlement of a disputed
debt representing a claimed loss merely establishes the amount of both
the loss and the debt-to "unliquidated" debts.1 5'
Both aspects of the majority's treatment of N. Sobel were puzzling. Its
holding that a taxpayer whose loss is represented by a disputed debt is
nevertheless entitled to claim that loss may have disadvantaged Zarin; in
general, however, it is extraordinarily taxpayer-favorable. Its holding
that the disputed debt exception to the debt discharge doctrine was lim-
ited to liquidated debts was flatly inconsistent with the facts of N. Sobel:
the taxpayer in that case had executed a note in a fixed amount, the
holder sued on the note, and the parties settled. 152 In sum, in its zeal to
find some way to tax the consumption value of Zarin's gambling, the Tax
Court majority rode roughshod over major structural elements of both
cash and accrual accounting-with potentially far-reaching implications.
Finally, the majority's treatment of § 108(e)(5), the statutory purchase
price adjustment exception, was both troubling and unnecessary. Appli-
cation of § 108(e)(5) to a purchase of chips requires use of the rejected
two-step approach to casino accounting. In other words, it requires that
the purchase of chips be accorded independent tax significance. Given
the court's prior uniform rejection of the two-step approach, the majority
might simply have held § 108(e)(5) inapplicable on the ground there was
no tax-cognizable purchase of chips. 153
Elements of the opinion can be read as consistent with such a holding.
The majority also, however, made an unfortunate attempt to demonstrate
that chips were not "property" within the meaning of the statute. 154 The
parties, of course, had stipulated that chips were property, and the Tax
Court rules specifically authorized stipulation of the application of law to
149. Id. at 1265.
150. Id.
151. At least one subsequent case appears to have adopted the Zarin Tax Court major-
ity's analysis in this regard. See Preslar v. Comm'r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding that "[t]o implicate the contested liability doctrine, the original amount of the debt
must be unliquidated").
152. Compare Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1095-96 (1989), rev'd on other grounds,
916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), with N. Sobel, 40 B.T.A. at 1264-65.
153. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) (1980).
154. See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1098.
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facts. 155 Apart from the stipulation, as matter of New Jersey law chips
represent unsecured demand debt of the casino; in other contexts, such
debt is normally treated as "property.' 56 In dissent, Judge Ruwe's tech-
nical critique of the majority's analysis on this issue was scathing and to
the point.157
Ironically, the majority's struggle with the issue was also largely irrele-
vant to future discharge-of-gambling-debt cases. 158 At the trial court
level, Zarin had not argued the nonstatutory purchase price adjustment
exception, and the court therefore had no reason to address it.159 The
nonstatutory exception, however, is not limited to "property." Consider,
for example, the following scenario. A law firm sends Taxpayer a bill for
$100,000 for nondeductible services. Although the firm might win if it
sued for the $100,000 and although the client does not formally dispute
the bill, discussions lead the firm to reduce its charges to $75,000 in what
the real world would view as a purchase price adjustment. Under the
nonstatutory exception, the partial discharge does not result in income to
the client, even though the services are clearly not "property."
How, then, should we evaluate the Tax Court majority's opinion? I
want to emphasize again that I have not yet addressed whether the court
correctly measured Zarin's income as a matter of theory-in other words,
whether the court was "right." My focus has rather been on the court's
treatment of rules and precedent. Clearly, the court was not merely ap-
plying rules to facts nor was it merely answering open questions. In its
zeal to tax Zarin's perceived consumption value, I suggest, the majority
was a bull in a china shop, breaking rules wherever it turned.
2. Tannenwald's Dissent
Judge Tannenwald was troubled by the majority's bottom line, and par-
ticularly by "the incongruous result that the more a gambler loses, the
greater his pleasure and the larger the increase in his wealth. '160 Appeal-
ing to common sense, he disagreed with the majority's assertion that
Zarin had received consumption value of $3,435,000.161 This factual con-
clusion was key to his analysis because it eliminated the theoretical pres-
sure to find income.162 This, in turn, eliminated the need for new law;
Tannenwald could rely on the traditional rule that debt must be enforcea-
ble to be "debt" and on a simple interpretation of the disputed debt ex-
155. Id. at 1097.
156. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:46-1.5(f) (2003) (providing that "each gaming chips is
solely as evidence of a debt that the issuing casino license owes the person legally in pos-
session of the gaming chips").
157. See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1107 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
158. The nonstatutory exception requires an examination of the cause of the discharge,
while the statutory exception does not. The majority's "property" analysis might, there-
fore, make a difference where cause is an issue.
159. See generally Zarin, 92 T.C. 1084.





ception to justify his conclusion that Zarin did not recognize discharge of
indebtedness income in 1981.163
Tannenwald's analysis can be criticized as technically inadequate. It is
true that he did not offer a sophisticated technical resolution of any of the
difficult issues the case raised, but this may have been intentional. His
approach would have disposed of a very odd case without creating any
significant new precedent. What likely motivated Tannenwald was
neither a mechanical respect for old cases nor an ignorance of theory. It
was more likely a jurisprudential concern-a judgment that this was sim-
ply the wrong case in which to make new law. He was right.
3. Jacobs's Dissent
Courts are usually reluctant to proceed on a theory that has not been
raised or briefed by the parties. There are good reasons for this, as Judge
Jacobs' dissent illustrates. 164 Jacobs was equally disturbed by the major-
ity's bottom line, but chose a more innovative technique for avoiding
it.165 Since Zarin's debt was void ab initio, he reasoned, Zarin must have
recognized income in 1980 to the extent of the value of the chips re-
ceived-3,435,000.166 This income, he argued, should be treated as gain
from wagering transactions within the meaning of § 165(d); as a result,
Zarin should be allowed to deduct his $3,435,000 of losses against that
income. 167 Jacobs seemed to assume, although he did not state so explic-
itly, that the result would be to avoid taxing the transaction altogether. 168
There were many problems with Jacobs' approach, problems that
would likely have been identified had the issues been briefed. First, his
approach was flatly inconsistent with governing Supreme Court case law.
In James v. United States, the Court held that a taxpayer may be charged
with income on the receipt of funds if and only if he received those funds
"without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obligation
to repay."'1 69 This rule applied regardless of whether the obligation was
legally enforceable. 170 Zarin, of course, was stipulated to have recog-
nized an obligation to repay. Additionally, there was no reason to be-
lieve that James was obsolete.
Second, Jacobs' proposed rule was unadministrable. Whether a debt is
"void ab initio" is often not determined until long after it is incurred.
One can readily imagine a conscientious taxpayer who fails to report in-
come in Year 1, believing that he has incurred enforceable debt on a
163. See id.





169. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961).
170. See Liddy v. Comm'r, 808 F.2d 312, 314 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[o]nly if the
taxpayer can show that he has no claim of right by reason of a requirement to make
prompt payments of amounts received even if such payments are made in the absence of
an enforceable obligation ... is the receipt of monies not deemed gross income").
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purchase. Some years later, he learns that the debt was void from the
outset. He is under no obligation to file an amended return for Year 1;171
indeed, he may be prohibited from doing so. The result is that he is never
taxed. Worse, Jacobs' proposed approach was not limited, in theory, to
gambling debt. It appeared to apply any time a debt incurred for any
purpose was subsequently determined to have been void from the outset.
Third, Jacobs' approach would have applied far more broadly, even in
the casino gambling context, than Jacobs appeared to recognize. In 1981,
casino gambling debts were generally enforceable in New Jersey. 172
Zarin's was an exception. 173 In Nevada, however, gambling debts were
generally unenforceable as a matter of law. 174 Under Jacobs's approach,
any gambler obtaining chips on credit in Nevada would apparently have
been required to report income at the moment he acquired the chips-a
very peculiar result. If he then subsequently lost those chips at gambling,
the loss could be used against such "chip income," but only if it were
incurred in the same year.
Finally, the approach would not have produced the bottom-line result
Jacobs expected. Zarin probably received over $100 million of chips in
exchange for unenforceable debt in 1980 alone.175 His gambling losses,
moreover, were clearly preference items for AMT purposes to the extent
they exceeded sixty percent of adjusted gross income.'7 6 For AMT pur-
poses, therefore, such losses would not fully have offset the "chip in-
come" Jacobs believed Zarin had recognized. The net effect would have
been a massive AMT tax liability.
4. Ruwe's dissent
Judge Ruwe, writing for himself and four others, treated the problem
as one of simple statutory exegesis, concluding that Zarin's debt dis-
charge income was exempt under § 108(e)(5), the statutory purchase
price adjustment exception.177 He began by observing that the factual
171. In general, taxpayers are not required to file amended returns, even if they dis-
cover that their original returns were incorrect.
172. The general New Jersey prohibition against the enforcement of gambling debts,
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:40-3, was made inapplicable to casino debts by N.J. Stat. Ann. 5:12-124.
See, e.g., Gottlob v. Lopez, 501 A.2d 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985),
173. The extension of credit by New Jersey casinos "to enable any person to take part
in gaming . . . activity as a player" is permitted by limited. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 5:12-
101(a)(1) (West 2006). Gambling credit extended in excess of the amount under Casino
Control Commission regulations is void ab initio. See Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc. v. Salo-
mone, 429 A.2d 1078 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
174. See, e.g., Weisbrod v. Fremont Hotel, 326 P.2d 1104 (Nev. 1958); Milliken v. Sloat,
1 Nev. 573 (1865). This rule was amended in 1983 through the enactment of Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 463.361-.366, which now permit enforcement of (1) gambling debts owed to li-
censed casinos and evidenced by "credit instruments," and (2) gambling debts owed by
licensed casinos to their patrons, regardless of whether so evidenced. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 463.361-.366 (West 2006).
175. See supra note 45.
176. See supra note 44.
177. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1107 (1989) (Ruwe, J., dissenting), rev'd on other
grounds, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
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predicates for the application of that statute had been stipulated by the
parties: "The parties stipulated that 'CHIPS ARE PROPERTY which
are not negotiable.' . . . In their briefs, both parties requested that the
Court find this as a fact. Despite this, the majority fails to adopt this
stipulated fact which is critical to the resolution of this case."'1 78
In addition, he argued, chips were encompassed by the plain language
of the statute, which should govern in the absence of "a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary."'1 79 In Dickman v. Commissioner, the
Supreme Court held that, unless legislative qualifications or restrictions
were imposed, the term "property" should be given "its broadest and
most comprehensive sense.' 80 "In this particular instance," Ruwe noted,
"neither the statute nor the accompanying legislative history qualify or
restrict the term 'property."181 "Property" normally includes chips and
the debt they represent; therefore, he concluded, it should be so con-
strued in this context as well.182
Furthermore, the very purpose of the statute was "to eliminate dis-
agreements between the Internal Revenue Service and the debtor as to
whether, in a particular case to which the provision applies, the debt re-
ductions should be treated as discharge income or a true price adjust-
ment."'1 83 Here, Ruwe noted, one of the principal factual issues was the
value of what Zarin had received-the precise issue that § 108(e)(5) was
supposed to eliminate.1 84
In addition to being contrary to the parties' Stipulation, contrary to the
plain language of the provision, and contrary to its purpose, Ruwe ar-
gued, the majority's construction created no clear rule for future applica-
tion of the statute. 185 While suggesting that § 108(e)(5) only applied to
"normal commercial property," the majority failed to define that term. 186
While suggesting that § 108(e)(5) "may apply to some kinds of in-
tangibles," but apparently not others, and asserting that "[a]bstract con-
cepts of property are not useful" in deciding what property is within the
contemplation of the section, the majority "leaves us to wonder what
kinds of intangible property might come within the contemplation of the
statute or what concepts, abstract or otherwise, were relied upon in con-
struing the meaning of the statute. 1 87
In conclusion, he stated:
The majority decides an issue of first impression by disregarding the
plain language of the statute without any justification in the statute
or legislative history. The result produced is ironic for both the
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 334-36 (1984).
181. Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1111 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1107.
183. Id. at 1112 (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-1035, at 16 (1980)).
184. Id. at 1112-13.
185. Id. at 1108.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1110.
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Court and petitioner. The Court must decide the difficult factual is-
sues that § 108(e)(5) was intended to eliminate while petitioner in-
curs a huge tax liability, the magnitude of which is in direct
proportion to his losses. 188
Ruwe's analysis was persuasive in all but three respects. First, it placed
ordinary canons of statutory interpretation above tax theoretical defini-
tions of "income"-a hierarchy the majority was unwilling to accept. Sec-
ond, it necessarily relied on a two-step approach to casino chip
accounting; it treated the "purchase" of chips as an event having indepen-
dent tax significance. This, as I have noted, was contrary to existing law.
Third, it applied § 108(e)(5) even though Zarin no longer owned the
chips at the time of the settlement. To fully appreciate why this might be
inappropriate, some understanding of the theory behind the purchase
price adjustment exception itself is necessary.
The purchase price adjustment exceptions are not really exceptions;
they are deferral provisions. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer
purchases a house in exchange for a $100,000 purchase money mortgage.
Thereafter, the taxpayer and seller negotiate a reduction of the mortgage
to $80,000. Whether the nonstatutory purchase price adjustment excep-
tion is available will depend on the reason for the adjustment; if the ad-
justment is really an adjustment to price, it should apply; if not, the
taxpayer will generally realize discharge of indebtedness income. The
reasons for a debt adjustment can sometimes be very difficult to prove.
Section 108(e)(5), in effect, offers a safe harbor; a taxpayer whose dis-
charge falls within the statutory confines need not prove the reason for
the discharge. Under either exception, however, the consequence is an
adjustment in the basis of the property. In our example, the taxpayer will
now take the house with a basis of $80,000, rather than $100,000. If she
then sells the house for $105,000, she will recognize $25,000 of gain rather
than $5,000. In other words, the $20,000 that she would otherwise have
recognized at the moment of discharge is now recognized on sale; it has
been deferred.
This deferral mechanism cannot operate unless the taxpayer still owns
the property. If the taxpayer has already disposed of the property and
has accounted for that disposition using the original higher basis, applica-
tion of either purchase price adjustment exception will mismeasure the
taxpayer's income over time. In Zarin's case, for example, Ruwe would
apparently have allowed Zarin the $3.435 million in 1980 gambling
losses-subject, of course, to the limitations of § 165(d)-because at the
time Zarin lost the chips they had a basis equal to their original purchase
price. Applying the statutory purchase price adjustment exception to ex-
clude any debt discharge income, he would therefore ultimately have
credited Zarin with $3.435 million of net losses even though Zarin was in
188. Id. at 1115-16.
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fact out of pocket only $500,000. In other words, Ruwe would have mis-
measured Zarin's income.
5. The Motion for Reconsideration
After losing in the Tax Court, Zarin changed counsel. His new counsel
moved for reconsideration, primarily on the ground that Zarin was insol-
vent both before and after the discharge. The IRS had made no effort to
prove solvency. Since the burden of proof rested on the IRS, Zarin now
argued, the court should have found that Zarin was exempt under the
insolvency exception of § 108(a). In further support of his motion, Zarin
filed affidavits and balance sheets as of May 31, 1981, and December 31,
1981-that is, before and after the discharge.18 9 Both balance sheets
showed liabilities (excluding Resorts' claim) in excess of his assets. Chief
Judge Nims, who had voted with the majority on the case-in-chief, held
that (1) insolvency was an affirmative defense, on which the burden of
proof rested with Zarin, (2) Zarin, through his original counsel, had con-
ceded the issue in brief, and (3) the balance sheets were of questionable
accuracy. He therefore denied the motion. Zarin changed counsel again,
retaining the firm in which I was a partner.
6. The Third Circuit Decision
On Zarin's behalf, we filed a notice of appeal with respect to 1981; the
IRS failed to file a cross-appeal with respect to 1980, and 1980 therefore
closed. For the first time, Zarin could argue 1981 with some assurance
that the IRS would not be able to argue in the alternative that he had
recognized income in 1980.190
Our analysis of prior tax decisions of members of the Third Circuit
panel assigned to the case suggested that Judges Cowen and Weis were
inclined to be pro-taxpayer and were partial to plain language arguments.
It also suggested that Judge Stapleton tended to vote for the government
in tax cases and was more of a theoretician. Our briefs therefore empha-
189. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
190. In its brief to the Third Circuit, the IRS stated: "[i]n the Tax Court, the Commis-
sioner abandoned the position that taxpayer had income in 1980 from larceny." Brief for
the Appellee, at 6, Zarin v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1240). In the
closing minutes of oral argument, however, IRS counsel argued for the first time that if the
court concluded income should have been reported in 1980 rather than 1981, it should
remand the case to the Tax Court for application of the mitigation provisions of I.R.C.
§§ 1311-1315. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38, Zarin, 916 F.2d 110 (No. 90-
1240). Neither party had briefed either the mitigation issue or any substantive issue relat-
ing to 1980. In the absence of briefing, the Third Circuit majority--clearly bewildered-
dealt with the problem with its incomprehensible footnote 12:
The Commissioner argues in the alternative that Zarin recognized $3,435,000
of income in 1980. This claim has no merit. Recognition of income would
depend upon a finding that Zarin did not have cancellation of indebtedness
income solely because his debt was unenforceable. We do not so hold. Al-
though unenforceability is a factor in our analysis, our decision ultimately
hinges upon the determination that the "disputed debt" rule applied, or al-
ternatively, that chips are not property within the meaning of I.R.C. § 108.
Zarin, 916 F.2d at 119.
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sized the human aspects of the case and framed Zarin's doctrinal argu-
ments, as much as possible, in plain language terms, only subsidiarily
exploring the technical accounting problems raised by the Tax Court's
opinion and the theoretical considerations discussed in Part II of this Ar-
ticle. When the decision came down, our predictions proved correct:
Judges Cowen and Weis voted for taxpayer, Judge Stapleton for the
government. 191
Judge Tannenwald's dissent, I have suggested, was probably the most
jurisprudentially prudent of the Tax Court opinions. In substance, the
Third Circuit majority opinion mirrored Tannenwald's; it held, in effect,
that Zarin had not received $3.435 million in value and that the discharge
was exempt because Zarin's debt was unenforceable and disputed. Yet,
the Third Circuit's opinion probably commands the least respect of any of
the Zarin opinions, at least within the tax community. Why?
Law is not merely the bottom line. Judge Aldisert, who has written
widely on the art of opinion-writing, has noted that: "the court's ability to
develop case law finds legitimacy only because the decision is accompa-
nied by a publicly recorded statement of reasons. ' 192 The selection of
material facts is part of that statement; so is the selection of authority
deemed relevant-whether or not that authority is followed.
Before the Third Circuit, Zarin cited extensive case law to the effect
that debt must be enforceable to be "debt" for tax purposes, concluding
with the observation that "Congress itself has adopted the rule in I.R.C.
§ 108."193 Judge Cowen, writing for the majority, ignored this case law,
seizing instead on the referenced language of § 108(d)(1)stating that,
"[f]or purposes of this section, 'indebtedness of the taxpayer" means any
indebtedness (A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or (B) subject to which
the taxpayer holds property. ' 194 Because Zarin's debt was unenforce-
able, he reasoned, it was not debt "for which the taxpayer is liable. 1 95 He
then considered at length whether Zarin's debt was debt "subject to
which [the taxpayer holds] property"-specifically, whether the chips
were property subject to his debt to Resorts-a question that had not
been briefed by either party.1 96 Adopting the Tax Court's § 108(e)(5) rea-
soning, he concluded that chips were not "property" within the meaning
of § 108(d)(1)(B) because they constituted "nothing more than an ac-
counting mechanism.1 97 He therefore held that Zarin's debt was not
debt for debt discharge purposes. 198 In effect, he adopted Judge Tannen-
wald's conclusion that unenforceable debt was not debt, but framed his
191. Judge Stapleton effectively adopted most of the Tax Court majority's arguments.
See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 117 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
192. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 9 (1990).
193. Brief of Appellant at 26, Zarin, 916 F.2d 110 (No. 90-1240).
194. Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 114.
198. Id. at 117.
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holding entirely in statutory terms.199
Judge Cowen also adopted Judge Tannenwald's second rationale-that
the debt was exempt because it was disputed. He found United States v.
Ha 200 and N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner20 1 indistinguishable. 2 2 Like
Judge Tannenwald, Judge Cowen seemed inclined to follow precedent,
however arguably defective, at least given the equities of the case. 203 It
was in the context of the disputed debt exception, however, that Judge
Cowen made his most controversial pronouncement. Explaining that ex-
ception, he offered his own illustration, again not taken from any of the
briefs:
Thus, if a taxpayer took out a loan for $10,000, refused in good faith
to pay the full $10,000 back, and then reached an agreement with the
lender that he would pay back only $7000 in full satisfaction of the
debt, the transaction would be treated as if the initial loan was $7000.
When the taxpayer tenders the $7000 payment, he will have been
deemed to have paid the full amount of the initially disputed debt.
Accordingly, there is no tax consequence to the taxpayer upon
payment.20 4
All well-trained tax lawyers know that this explanation is "wrong"; I will
discuss why in Part II.A below. The effect of the explanation, therefore,
was to destroy the credibility of what might otherwise have been a plausi-
ble opinion.
Two observations about Judge Cowen's approach to the disputed debt
issue may be useful. First, it was completely consistent with his "plain
language" approach to the case as a whole. Having accepted that a dis-
199. Professor Shaviro has criticized Judge Cowen's decision on two grounds: (1) that
§108 is not necessarily co-extensive with the general debt discharge rule, and (2) that the
burden was on Zarin to show that the receipt was excludible. See generally Shaviro, The
Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measurement of Taxable Con-
sumption, supra note 23. Shaviro's arguments are not well-founded. The history of § 108
and its predecessor sections strongly suggests that it was intended to address whatever
"debt" might otherwise be subject to the discharge of indebtedness doctrine. As has been
noted, see supra note 88 and accompanying text, I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) was apparently added
only for purposes of completeness and has never previously been construed as having inde-
pendent substantive effect. To hold that § 61(a)(12) encompasses discharges of unenforce-
able debt but that § 108 does not would lead to very peculiar results. A discharge of
unenforceable debt, for example, would be income, but would be ineligible for the statu-
tory insolvency exception of I.R.C. § 108(a). Shaviro's second argument, that Zarin has
the burden of showing that the receipt was excludible, ignores the fact that the burden
issue was decided against the IRS in the Tax Court, see Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084,
1088, rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), and was conceded by the IRS
before the Third Circuit, see Brief for the Appellee at 24-25, Zarin, 916 F.2d 110 (No. 90-
1240).
There was, nevertheless, a simple construction of I.R.C. § 108(d)(1) that would have
allowed it to encompass unenforceable debt: that § (A) referred to personal debt, and
§ (B) to secured debt. I.R.C. § 108(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1980). The IRS neglected to make this
argument.
200. 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962).
201. 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939).




puted debt exception was required by precedent, he then simply inter-
preted it in accordance with its plain language meaning, not by reference
to theory. There was a bona fide dispute, therefore the exception ap-
plied. Second, the disputed debt rationale may have spoken with particu-
lar force to Judge Cowen because of his prior connection with the issues
involved. Prior to his elevation to the Third Circuit, Judge Cowen had
served as magistrate in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey.205 In that capacity, he had presided over Zarin v. Resorts
International Hotel, Inc.,206 one of the two substantive cases in which the
underlying controversy had been litigated. Judge Cowen knew for a fact
that the debt was disputed.
II. WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED: A
THEORIST'S ACCOUNT
Practitioners live in a world of precedent and authority, scholars at
least partially in a world of theory. The relationship between the two is
sometimes uneasy, as the foregoing discussion of the Zarin opinions illus-
trates. We turn now to the problem of theory and the question beloved
of scholars: who was "right"? Several theoretical tools are commonly
used in construing the Internal Revenue Code. These are not "rules" in
the ordinary sense-not statutes or explicit rules of decision. Yet they
affect the course of tax litigation and interpretation more profoundly
than many more explicit rules, and Zarin implicates them all.
A. COMPLETE ACCOUNTING
The first "rule" can be thought of as an interpretive principle: in gen-
eral the Code should be construed, if possible, so that a taxpayer's report-
able income, taking into account all relevant years, will ultimately equal
her real income.207 This principle has never been recognized as such by
any court and has no commonly accepted name. I have elsewhere called
it the "principle of complete accounting," since it focuses on the need to
account completely for taxpayer's income rather than on other aspects of
accurate measurement. 20 8 For convenience, I will use the same term
here. Complete accounting does not mean we should ignore the rule that
income is to be computed annually. What it does mean is that the various
rules we apply annually should be structured and construed to work to-
gether to measure tax base income completely over time-not to leave
anything out and not to count anything twice.
The principle of complete accounting is intuitive to most tax profes-
sionals and has a powerful normative appeal. Decisions that flout the
principle without compelling statutory authorization are viewed as
205. ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 30 (Megan Rosen ed., Aspen Publishers
2006) (1984).
206. Civil Action No. 80-3972 (D.N.J. 1980).
207. By "real income," I mean such income as Congress has included in the tax base.
208. See Seto, supra note 26, at 227-34.
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"wrong." Even statutes that flout the principle are viewed with suspicion.
Courts will often ignore precedent and sometimes even the plain lan-
guage of the Code to ensure complete accounting.20 9
This is why tax professionals view Judge Cowen's illustration of the
disputed debt exception as obviously incorrect. Recall that in his exam-
ple, a taxpayer borrows $10,000, refuses in good faith to pay it back, and
settles with the lender by paying back only $7,000. On these facts, Judge
Cowen suggested, the taxpayer will not recognize any income upon the
discharge. In reality, of course, our hypothetical taxpayer is $3,000
wealthier. The principle of complete accounting requires that at some
point the taxpayer be charged with $3,000 of income, so that his reporta-
ble income will ultimately equal his real income. Otherwise, our account-
ing of his transactions will be incomplete; we will have failed to account
for $3,000 of income. If the taxpayer is not required to report income
when he takes out the loan, then he must be required to report it when he
settles the debt. In the case of a cash loan this is true regardless of
whether the debt is disputed, Judge Cowen's dictum to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Indeed, the principle of complete accounting requires this conclusion
even if the debt is unenforceable. So long as the taxpayer is not required
to report any income when he takes out the loan, complete accounting
requires the recognition of $3,000 at some point-the only obvious possi-
bility being the moment of discharge. This, in turn, explains why the Tax
Court majority was willing to do violence to so much existing law. Hav-
ing concluded that Zarin had received $2,945,000 in consumption value
for which he had not paid, it felt compelled to find a way to construe the
available rules to account for that income completely.
The same principle explains why Judge Tannenwald had to disagree
with the Tax Court majority's conclusions with regard to value before he
could rely on existing precedent to dispose of the case. Had he agreed
with the majority's value analysis, he too would probably have felt com-
pelled to find a way to tax that value.
It also explains why Judge Ruwe was "wrong." Complete accounting
requires that any purchase price adjustment exception normally be lim-
ited to cases in which the taxpayer has sufficient remaining basis in the
purchased property to absorb the entire adjustment. 210 Any other con-
struction of those exceptions is likely to result in the mismeasurement of
the taxpayer's income over time. And this, in turn, suggests that the
courts could not properly have accepted Zarin's nonstatutory purchase
price adjustment argument either.
209. See id.




But what is income? What is it that we are to account for under the
principle of complete accounting? A second tool commonly used to
make sense of the Code is the so-called "Haig-Simons" definition of in-
come, which states that a taxpayer's income equals (1) his or her change
in net worth plus (2) his or her consumption.211 The Haig-Simons defini-
tion explains many of the most important structural features of the Code.
Some examples, focusing on aspects of the theory particularly relevant to
the Zarin problem, may be useful. 212
Example 1: Taxpayer receives value and does not lose or consume it.
Her net worth therefore increases. The Haig-Simons definition says she
should have income, and § 61 of the Code so provides by requiring her to
report gross income.
Example 2: Taxpayer receives value and consumes it. Her net worth
therefore remains the same, but she has consumption. Haig-Simons says
she should have income. The Code accomplishes this in two ways: first,
by making the receipt of consumption taxable, and second, by making
consumption expenditures nondeductible. Under § 61, Haig-Simons sug-
gests, gross income includes the unpaid-for receipt of consumption value;
§ 262 denies deductions for personal expenditures that are paid for.
Example 3: Taxpayer spends value for the purpose of producing future
income. Her net worth therefore decreases. She has no consumption,
because by consumption the Haig-Simons definition means personal use,
not business use or use in a for-profit activity. Theory, therefore, says she
should have a deduction, and the Code so provides. Section 162 autho-
rizes a deduction for trade or business expenses and § 212 provides a de-
duction for the costs of producing income.
I have argued elsewhere that the principle of complete accounting ap-
plied to a Haig-Simons definition of income explains most of the essential
features of the discharge of indebtedness doctrine.213 I focus here on its
implications for the discharge of two kinds of debt particularly relevant to
the Zarin problem: (1) debt incurred to pay for deductible costs of pro-
ducing income, and (2) debt incurred to pay for current consumption.
If a taxpayer incurs but does not pay debt to pay for deductible costs of
producing income, whether a discharge of that debt is taxable should de-
pend on whether she was allowed a deduction when she incurred the debt
in the first place. Taking into account the entire sequence of transactions,
she has experienced neither an increase in net worth nor any consump-
211. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); Robert M. Haig,
The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7
(Robert M. Haig ed., 1921). For a summary of the economic literature on the definition of
income, see GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 24, at 106-07. See also Victor Thuronyi, The
Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 46 (1990).
212. For a more expansive discussion of how Haig-Simons explains important features
of the Code, see generally Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability
to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053 (2006).
213. See Seto, supra note 26, at 237-38.
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tion. Complete accounting should therefore result in no net taxable in-
come or loss, taking all tax consequences into account. If the taxpayer
was allowed a deduction when she incurred the debt (as she normally
would be if she were an accrual method taxpayer), complete accounting
requires that she recognize income when the debt is discharged without
payment. The taxable discharge in effect reverses the earlier deduction.
The tax matches Haig-Simons income, and the principle of complete ac-
counting has been satisfied. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer has not
been allowed a deduction when she incurred the debt (as would normally
be the case if she were a cash method taxpayer), there is no deduction to
reverse and no real income to account for. The principle of complete
accounting therefore implies that she should have no debt discharge in-
come at all.214
By contrast, if a taxpayer pays for current consumption-for example, a
catered personal party-by incurring debt, the principle of complete ac-
counting applied to a Haig-Simons definition of income implies that a
discharge of that debt must result in income regardless of her accounting
method. The taxpayer has received consumption value without paying
for it; at some point, she must be required to report a corresponding
amount of income.
The Tax Court majority's opinion was based on the conclusion that
Zarin had received $2,935,000 of taxable consumption without paying for
it. Consistent with the Haig-Simons definition, therefore, it bent existing
law to require Zarin to report that amount as income upon the discharge.
The key assumption underlying the majority's theoretical analysis was,
therefore, that gambling should be treated as consumption rather than as
an income-producing activity. Although none of the Zarin opinions dis-
cuss this issue, the issue is far more difficult than it might at first appear.
Many economic activities involve both an element of pleasure and a po-
tential for the production of income. Speculating in currency futures and
playing craps, for example, are similarly ambiguous in this regard: though
the average participant loses, there is nevertheless some potential for the
production of income-indeed, that is primarily what draws participants
to both activities-and there is a thrill involved in each.
We might determine whether currency futures trading and gambling
are consumption or income-producing activities on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Groetzinger, for example, held
that whether a gambler was engaged in a trade or business should be
determined separately for each taxpayer.2 15 Thus, we might inquire into
the particulars of Zarin's motives and behavior. If we conclude that he
was primarily having fun we would tax him on his debt discharge. If, on
214. An illustration of this principle appears in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1947), where the IRS apparently conceded that Mrs. Crane's "debt" should not be treated
as including her valid state law debt for accrued but unpaid interest-presumably because,
as a cash method taxpayer, she had not yet been allowed to take that interest into account
for deduction purposes.
215. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 36 (1987).
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the other hand, we conclude that he was primarily in it for the money
(and, of course, that under applicable accounting rules he should not be
allowed a deduction merely by reason of incurring the debt), we would
treat his discharge as nontaxable.
There are at least two problems with a case-by-case approach. First, it
is extremely difficult to administer. Note that the Haig-Simons question
is not whether the activity constitutes a trade or business (the Groetzinger
question), but merely whether the activity is engaged in for profit-
whether, in the language of the § 183 regulations, "the taxpayer entered
into the activity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a
profit. ' 21 6 Some gamblers may expect to lose and gamble just to have
fun, but most, however irrationally, hope to beat the odds and make
money.217 Many do. Groetzinger to the contrary notwithstanding, a debt
discharge rule that turns on the expectations and intentions of each gam-
bler either will not work or will always lead to a conclusion that the gam-
bler hoped to make money. Second, a case-by-case approach is
inconsistent with the way the Code treats gambling generally. In general,
the Code taxes gamblers the same way regardless of their motives, just as
it taxes currency futures traders consistently regardless of their motives.
In other words, Congress has arguably categorized these activities by
statute.
An alternative approach, therefore, might be to examine the structure
of the Code itself to see whether gambling is treated per se as a consump-
tion or income-producing activity. Unfortunately, the answer is ambigu-
ous. 21 8 Gambling winners are taxed as if they were engaged in an
income-producing activity-that is, they are taxed solely on their increase
in net worth, not on their increase in net worth plus the consumption
value of their gambling. Net gambling losses, however, are not deducti-
ble. This might suggest a congressional decision to treat net gambling
losses, in effect, as the costs of consumption. Alternatively, we might
view the gambling loss limitation rules simply as another example of bas-
keting; prohibiting the use of one kind of losses to offset other types of
income. Under this latter view, Judge Jacobs' proposal to treat Zarin's
debt discharge income as within the gambling basket would be consistent
with the purpose of the statute.
Some have suggested that the Code's ambiguous treatment of gambling
reflects an outdated moral disapproval of the activity itself.2 19 This may
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
217. As the Tax Court stated in Collins v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 557, 563
(1992):
The opportunity to win money is not the only reason a betting ticket is valua-
ble, but it is the overwhelming motivation for most gamblers. The different
kinds of excitement associated with gambling are inextricably bound to the
possibility of winning money. Gambling is not very interesting without the
opportunity to win or lose something of value.
218. See Zorn, supra note 23, at 5-10 (giving an overview of current tax rules applicable
to gambling).
219. See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
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be true. Even assuming that we can find our way past the moral issues,
however, the more fundamental conceptual problem remains: it is ex-
tremely difficult to separate out the pleasurable and income-producing
aspects of gambling.220 Like § 274(n), which limits the deduction of busi-
ness meals, or § 183, which limits the deduction of hobby expenses,
§ 165(d) may simply acknowledge the impossibility of a clean and princi-
pled resolution of the issue.221
On its stipulated facts, Zarin does not present these ambiguities as
sharply as it might. Were we to apply a Groetzinger analysis to the case,
we might conclude that Zarin was engaged in consumption. Had Zarin
not earlier faced a risk of criminal liability, however, his counsel might
well have asserted a profit-making motive. Collins v. Commissioner, de-
cided two years after Zarin, presented the issue much more starkly.2 22 In
Collins, a ticket seller at an off-track betting parlor in New York placed
racing bets on his own behalf without paying for them. He was caught
and pleaded guilty to grand larceny.223 Consistent with precedent, the
Tax Court held that he thereby recognized ordinary income from theft,
and that his wagering losses could not be deducted against such in-
come.22 4 To bolster this perfectly adequate legal analysis, however, the
court felt it necessary to invoke theory, holding as matter of law that
gambling is a form of consumption. 22 5 Haig-Simons, it reasoned, there-
fore required that the pre-race value of the bets be included in taxpayer's
income. 226
Was Collins engaged in gambling as consumption or gambling as an
income-producing activity? The Collins court, contrary to Groetzinger,
appeared to hold that gambling was consumption per se. At the same
time, it argued quite forcefully that the objective of most gamblers was to
make money, a statement legally inconsistent with that holding. The par-
ties in Collins had not stipulated that gambling was consumption; indeed,
they had stipulated that the taxpayer acted as he did because he "would
like some money. '227 The basis for the court's conclusion that Collins'
gambling was consumption, therefore, was not clear. In the circum-
stances, its invocation of Haig-Simons muddied rather than cleared the
waters. Ironically, Collins appears to have been the first United States
tax case ever explicitly to invoke the Haig-Simons definition of income as
a tool of decision.
220. Professor Zorn takes the position that gambling should be subject to the same tax
rules as any other potentially income-producing activity. See id. at 53-54. His proposal
ignores the practical inadministrability of any regime for the taxation of gambling that
requires a factual determination of each gambler's motives.
221. See I.R.C. §§ 165(d), 183, 274(a) (West 2006).







In general, we are left without a clear Haig-Simons answer to the ques-
tion of whether a discharge of gambling debt should be income. Even if
we are willing to conclude that generally, or in a particular case, gambling
should be treated as consumption, we are also left with Judge Tannen-
wald's conundrum: how can it possibly make sense to hold that losers
have more consumption value than winners; that the unluckiest gamblers
should be taxed as though they had the most fun? To resolve this ques-
tion, we turn to a less well-explored but equally important aspect of tax
theory.
C. THE USE OF MARKETS TO MEASURE AND DEFINE INCOME
Although Haig-Simons theorists sometimes speak of value and income
in the abstract, the Internal Revenue Code relies on markets to measure
both. The use of market value is objective and administrable, approxi-
mates subjective value so long as markets are efficient (and often even if
they are not), and is generally consistent with lay notions of just taxation.
Even absent an actual arm's-length market transaction, the Code con-
structs a hypothetical market transaction to define value-the mythic
willing seller and willing buyer acting without compulsion and with rea-
sonable information.228 That this definition is merely a stop-gap, how-
ever, normally to be applied only if we have no actual market transaction,
is demonstrated by the fact that we almost never second-guess actual
market transactions on the ground that a party acted under compulsion
or lacked essential information. When the sign in the store says "Lost
Lease, Must Sell," we do not treat the lucky buyers as recognizing income
by reason of their bargain purchases even if we can demonstrate that the
seller is acting under extreme duress.229 Conversely, when a buyer pays
more than he should for an item simply because he lacks basic and rea-
sonably available information, we do not allow him to claim a loss. In our
system, arm's-length markets almost always rule.
Some have suggested that compulsive behavior might properly be sub-
ject to a special set of tax rules.230 Compulsive behavior, however, is
merely one departure from the assumption of efficient markets that al-
lows us to use actual market transactions to approximate subjective value.
Were we to apply different valuation rules in cases of compulsive behav-
ior, consistency would require that we apply different rules in other im-
perfect market situations as well-for example, in cases involving
monopolistic pricing, positive externalities (including "psychic income"),
or failures of information. This would dramatically increase the complex-
ity of our tax system. As a practical matter, an administrable system sim-
ply cannot require its agents to determine whether a taxpayer was acting
228. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much, supra note 23, at 236-39. Contra
Barton, supra note 23, 773-75.
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with "free will" or, on the contrary, was a compulsive gambler, cocaine
addict, alcoholic, workaholic, or chocaholic.
A market-based approach to the measurement of income works fairly
well for most transactions. There are two contexts, however, in which it
works poorly or not at all.
First, the use of markets to measure income often does not work in
cases involving unconventional transactions or pricing structures. In such
cases, courts are more likely to look beyond pure market-based measure-
ment. One well-known example is Turner v. Commissioner, in which a
taxpayer won two non-transferable first-class steamship tickets from New
York to Buenos Aires.23' The retail price of the tickets was $2,220.232
With an annual income of just $4,535, however, it was unlikely that tax-
payer would have purchased the tickets in a conventional market transac-
tion or, indeed, kept the tickets if he had been given the option of selling
them.233 In the circumstances, therefore, the court looked beyond mar-
ket pricing in an attempt to assess directly the tickets' subjective value to
the taxpayer. 23 4
A casino is an unconventional market. 235 Patrons do not necessarily
pay for what they get or get what they expected. Nevertheless, casinos
are businesses and do provide services. The total price paid by gamblers
collectively for such services equals their collective gambling losses (or
the casinos' net gambling revenues) over the long term.236 If casino gam-
bling is consumption, therefore, the gamblers' collective losses represent
the market value of such consumption. The problem is that casino pricing
is collective, not individual. How much an individual gambler pays for his
or her consumption value depends on whether he wins or loses. Only
losers pay; winners get their consumption value for free.
In such a market, how should we assign consumption value among indi-
vidual taxpayers for Haig-Simons purposes? One possibility would be to
treat gambling as having, in effect, a per-bet consumption value. 237




235. This may explain in part why a disproportionate number of gambling cases appear
in tax textbooks. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 24 (1987) (discussing
whether parimutuel wagering can be a trade or business); United States v. Hughes Props.,
Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 595 (1986) (discussing whether amounts guaranteed for payment on
progressive slot machines are deductible by accrual method taxpayers); Flamingo Resort,
Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1982) (addressing whether receipt of
unenforceable gambling debts meets the all events test for income recognition by an ac-
crual method taxpayer); Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876, 876 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing
whether "tokes" given to a craps dealer are gifts).
236. See ABT ET AL., supra note 27, at 42. Casino gamblers' collective losses pay not
only for the fun of gambling, but also for so-called "comps" and below-market prices for
meals and lodging. Thus Professor Shaviro's suggestion that Zarin should have been sub-
ject to additional taxation on his comps is incorrect. See Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too
Much, supra note 23, at 235-36. Collectively, gamblers pay for everything they get. There is
no such thing as a collective free lunch.
237. See Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much, supra note 23, at 231-35.
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Under such an approach, a gambler who places a particular bet would be
deemed to have received the same consumption value regardless of
whether he wins or loses. The measure of consumption value under such
an approach would be expected cost. A gambling winner would be taxed
on both his winnings and the expected cost of his bets. A gambling loser
would be taxed on the same expected cost; he would be allowed a deduc-
tion for losses in excess of expected cost. Under such an approach, Zarin
would be treated as having received $3.435 million of consumption value;
over several hundred thousand roles of the dice, his actual losses proba-
bly very closely approximated his expected losses.
There are, however, at least three problems with such an approach.
First, it is inconsistent with current law. Gambling winners are not cur-
rently taxed on expected cost; losers are not permitted to deduct loses in
excess of expected cost. A Haig-Simons analysis that implies rules radi-
cally different from current law is of limited use in interpreting that law.
Second, such an approach would be unadministrable unless we are will-
ing to accept actual net losses as a proxy for expected losses. To compute
expected losses directly, we would need to keep track of every bet a gam-
bler makes; in a casino, this is utterly impractical. The use of net losses as
a proxy for expected losses is statistically defensible for high-volume
gamblers in games strictly of chance. It is not statistically valid, however,
for gamblers who place relatively few bets or gamblers who play games
combining skill and chance, such as poker, blackjack, or pari-mutuel bet-
ting. A Haig-Simons analysis limited to certain gamblers and certain
games is far less attractive than one applicable to gambling generally.
Finally and most importantly, the assumption of a fixed per-bet con-
sumption value is unrealistic. We all know that it is more fun to win than
to lose. Stated more theoretically, gamblers bet not merely for money,
but for consumption value as well. If they win, they win both money and
consumption value. If they lose, they lose money and are unhappy to
boot. Judge Tannenwald's intuition that it makes no sense to hold that
"the more a gambler loses, the greater his pleasure" 238 may therefore
have support in pricing theory. The fact that Zarin "paid" $3,435,000
does not necessarily mean that he received an equivalent amount of con-
sumption value. A part of that money went to paying for someone else's
consumption value, someone who was luckier than he.
But if we believe it is more fun to win than to lose, then the Tax Court's
Haig-Simons analysis was 180 degrees wrong. It would tax losers on non-
existent consumption value and exempt winners-who do receive con-
sumption value-from taxation altogether. If we believe it is more fun to
win than to lose, then there is no Haig-Simons reason to tax the discharge
of any casino gambling debt at all, enforceable or unenforceable, dis-
puted or admitted. By definition, the debtor is a loser. By definition,
238. Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting), rev'd on
other grounds, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
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therefore, he has little or no consumption value to tax.239 This, in turn,
would suggest that United States v. Hall, which appeared to hold that dis-
charge of gambling debt was exempt per se from the debt discharge doc-
trine, was theoretically sound.240
A second situation in which a market-based approach to valuation does
not work is when two market transactions arguably bear on the same
value. A taxpayer makes an initial deal in a market transaction; subse-
quently, that deal is adjusted for reasons that bear on the fairness or ap-
propriateness of the original transaction. I will call the latter
"rescissionary" adjustments.
Rescissionary adjustments arise in a wide variety of situations. There
may be disputes about the value of whatever was purchased. Consumer
protection statutes may force an adjustment where legislatures worry that
consumers are not being treated fairly. As a matter of good business
practice, a seller may even make rescissionary adjustments when it is not
legally obligated to do so. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer has pur-
chased an airline ticket for $400 using a third party credit card to pay for
the purchase. The airline subsequently lowers the relevant fare to $300
and, although not legally obligated to do so, refunds the difference to the
taxpayer as a credit to his charge account. Intuitively, most of us would
view this as a purchase price adjustment, not as income, even though the
market at the time of the original purchase clearly supported the $400
price. 241
There are at least two possible ways to determine whether an adjust-
ment to debt is rescissionary. One way is to attempt an independent val-
uation of the merits of the original market price-looking, perhaps, at
comparable goods and transactions in the same vicinity at about the same
time. In many situations, however, this will not work. Perhaps, for exam-
ple, in 1980, Resorts discounted the debts of really big spenders, but on
an irregular and informal basis; it would be virtually impossible to use this
information to determine one "true" value of what Zarin received. In
our airline ticket hypothetical, an independent assessment of original
value would conclude that the original value was in fact $400, and would
lead to the conclusion that the taxpayer recognized debt discharge in-
come on the adjustment.
The second is to examine the reasons for the adjustment, the approach
courts have historically taken in applying the nonstatutory purchase price
239. The losing gambler is distinguishable in this regard from the concert-goer who
does not enjoy the concert. It is true that the latter has little or no consumption value
either. There is no administrable way, however, to tax happy and unhappy concert-goers
differently. By contrast, we already tax winning and losing gamblers differently. There is
no administrability problem in exempting the discharge of gambling debts; to the contrary,
a rule subjecting such discharges to tax would likely be far harder to administer.
240. See United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir. 1962).
241. I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) would not apply to this adjustment for two reasons: (1) the debt
is third-party debt, and (2) airline tickets represent services, not property. I.R.C.
§ 108(e)(5) (West 2006).
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adjustment exception. 242 We might, for example, attempt to resolve
Zarin by holding that the New Jersey casino credit laws were intended to
protect gamblers; the unenforceability of Zarin's debts, in effect, might be
treated as representing a legislative judgment that gamblers in Zarin's
position were paying more than they should for what they were getting.
Outside the casino context, New Jersey law affirmatively provides for the
rescission of gambling transactions, 243 as do the laws of many other
states.244 Are such rescissions taxable? This seems intuitively implausi-
ble, yet the Zarin Tax Court majority opinion clearly implies that they
are.
One final, and theoretically very important, question relating to mar-
kets may also bear on the Zarin issue: Is the taxation of nonmarket in-
come authorized by the current Code at all? Haig-Simons suggests that it
is-that all increases in wealth and all current consumption, whether or
not realized in a market, are presumptively taxable under § 61 of the
Code. Nevertheless, in practice nonmarket income is generally not taxed.
Some tax colleagues with whom I have discussed this issue explain the
exclusion of nonmarket income as a matter of administrative grace; the
IRS, they argue, simply chooses not to tax imputed and other nonmarket
income, although statutorily authorized to do so. Such an explanation is
problematic. Taxpayers have an obligation to self-assess. There is no
substantial authority to the effect that imputed or other nonmarket in-
come is excludible. The nonmarket economy, moreover, is huge. It
seems unlikely that an administrative agency, without any formal deliber-
ation or ruling, would exempt an entire sector of the economy from its
purview.
I suggest that under current law the taxation of nonmarket income is
not generally authorized-that is, that if the IRS sought to tax the im-
puted value of owner-occupied homes or other nonmarket consumption
without first seeking an amendment to the Code, it would fail. In this
regard, Haig-Simons neither describes nor justifies current law.245
242. See Seto, supra note 26, at 272-81.
243. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-5 provides as follows: "If any person shall lose any
money ... in violation of section 2A:40-1 of this title, and shall pay or deliver the same or
any part thereof to the winner.., such person may sue for and recover such money...
from such winner." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-5 (West 2005).
244. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-150 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-103 (2006); D.C.
CODE § 16-1702 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-3 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.020
(LexisNexis 2002); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 12-110 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 137 § 1 (LexisNexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.315 (West 2006); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 87-1-5 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 434.030 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 23-5-131 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-5-1 (LexisNexis 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3763.02 (LexisNexis 2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.740 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 32-1-10 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-6-1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-106
(2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-15 (1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-9-2 (West 2000).
245. I offer a possible alternative theory. The federal income tax is not most accurately
characterized as a tax on income; it is better conceived as a tax on market transactions
measured by income. As a tax on market transactions, it is one of the broadest taxes
currently practicable. One of the principal functions of government is to create and protect
markets; a tax on market transactions is therefore justified on the ground that it is imposed
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Current law distinguishes between taxable market activity and nontax-
able nonmarket activity primarily on the basis of formal indicators-par-
ticularly the passage of money. In Commissioner v. Daehler, for example,
a real estate broker handled his own home purchase and, as a result, was
repaid a portion of the brokerage fee that he paid on the purchase.246 In
other words, the broker's cash traveled to the seller, to the broker's em-
ployer, and then back to broker, all in payment for services the broker
had performed for himself. Had no cash passed, it is almost certain that
the value of those services would never have been taxed. Because the
transaction passed through the market, however, the court held that the
broker was taxable on the brokerage fees that he, in effect, paid
himself.2 47
Is the provision of gambling consumption value a market activity? If
not, we should exempt the consumption value of gambling even if we
conclude that gambling is consumption. Clearly Resorts looks a lot like
any other commercial service provider, regulated the way other market
participants are regulated. Zarin, it would appear, went into the market
to gamble.
The problem is that a poker game at Resorts International is formally
indistinguishable from a nonmarket kitchen poker game. Both use cash;
both use the same rules. Our rules for the taxation of gambling must
work in both market and nonmarket contexts. If we propose to tax the
consumption value of poker at Resorts, it becomes very difficult to avoid
taxing the consumption value of the kitchen poker game.
Assume that the Tax Court majority opinion in Zarin becomes the law.
You and I play poker at my kitchen table. You ante in an IOU, unen-
forceable under state law, and lose, but you never pay. The Tax Court
majority opinion tells us that you must report taxable income in the
amount of that IOU, representing the consumption value of that poker
game to you. As a matter of law, if you have read and understood Zarin
and willfully omit that IOU from your return, you have committed a fel-
ony. I doubt that the Tax Court majority intended to hold so.
And therein lies yet another problem in the structuring of workable
rules for the taxation of gambling debt discharges. Gambling is ambigu-
ous not merely as to whether it is a consumption or on income-producing
activity. It is also formally ambiguous as to whether it is a market or non-
on those who benefit from government activity. Because it is measured by income, it is
also fair because it is imposed on those with the ability to pay.
The foregoing theory, unlike more conventional explanations, provides guidance as to
the appropriate international scope of the United States income tax: the tax should be
imposed on those who benefit from the market-creating and -protecting activities of the
United States government. It also suggests that the corporate income tax may not, in fact,
be a double tax. Corporations benefit from markets and are therefore subject to tax; their
shareholders benefit in the course of different market activities and should also be subject
to tax. Most pertinent to Zarin, this theory suggests that nonmarket activities are exempt
from tax as a matter of congressional will, not as a matter of administrative grace.




market activity. The Code clearly taxes net gambling winnings. Taxing
the consumption value of gambling in market contexts, however, would
require a far more complex set of rules than we currently have-rules
that would distinguish market from non-market gambling and consump-
tion from income-producing gambling. I wonder whether the resulting
mess would make anyone happier.
D. THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Code, of course, is a statute, and Zarin a case of statutory interpre-
tation. Nontax scholars and judges may therefore find elements of the
foregoing discussion of theory puzzling. When, after all, did Professors
Haig and Simons get the authority to interpret the Code? Should we not
instead inquire as to the language, intent, and purpose of the statute, ap-
plying standard canons of statutory construction as did Judges Ruwe and
Cowen? After all, the ultimate issue was not whether Zarin had untaxed
Haig-Simons consumption. The ultimate issue was the proper construc-
tion of the Code.
The evident lack of consensus regarding the Zarin case within both the
courts and the scholarly community reflects a larger lack of consensus
about statutory interpretation itself. Traditionally, courts have attempted
to construe statutes in a manner consistent with the "intentions" of the
enacting legislature, focusing on legislative history and similar evidence
of legislative "intent. '248 It has been objected, however, that collective
bodies cannot have "intentions," that in fact much legislation reflects plu-
ralist or rent-seeking compromises by legislators with widely disparate
motives.249 This has resulted in proposals to limit judicial inquiry to the
"plain language" of the statute itself, excluding all inquiries as to motive
or reason; absurd outcomes, proponents argue, should be corrected by
the legislature. 250 Strict plain language approaches, however, are often
248. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984) (finding that discovery and
application of legislative intent is a court's sole task); 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (4th ed. 1984) (noting that the "intent of the leg-
islature" is the criterion most often cited in statutory interpretation); Learned Hand, How
Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 103, 105-10 (3d ed. 1960). See also generally Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Earl
M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Inten-
tionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7
COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907).
249. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 16-
25 (1994). See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
250. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construc-
tion, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (discussing the use of textualism by Justice
Scalia); Richard Pildes, Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982); Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term
of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos,




both indeterminate and rigid. Legislatures, moreover, do not necessarily
cooperate by correcting absurd outcomes. A plain language approach,
therefore, may simply lead to absurd law. This possibility, in turn, has
reinvigorated proposals to construe statutes in a manner consistent with
their "purpose"-inferred primarily from the structure of the statutes
themselves and the historic contexts in which they were enacted.2 51
Whether "purpose" is really different from "intention," however, is ques-
tionable.252 More recently, Professor Eskridge has suggested that over
time courts inevitably and properly depart from all such archeological
inquiries; the interpretation of each statute does and should develop its
own evolving logic independent of the original legislative will.253 But Es-
kridge's approach, known as "dynamic" statutory interpretation, comes
uncomfortably close to suggesting that courts can and should legislate.
Each of these schools has its exemplar among the Zarin opinions.
Judge Ruwe argued that standard indicators of congressional intent sup-
ported the conclusion that § 108(e)(5) exempted Zarin's debt discharge
income. Judge Cowen, for the Third Circuit, apparently used a plain lan-
guage approach in applying both § 108 and the disputed debt exception-
persuading no one in the process.
The principle of complete accounting, which requires rejection of both
the § 108(e)(5) argument and Judge Cowen's extravagant explanation of
the disputed debt exception, is easy to justify by reference to the purposes
of the Code as a whole. The evident purpose of the Code is to tax "in-
come"; the principle of complete accounting is necessary to measure in-
come correctly; it follows that the provisions of the Code should be
construed, to the extent possible, in a manner consistent with that
principle.
The Tax Court majority's implicit reliance on the Haig-Simons defini-
tion of income, by contrast, is probably an example of dynamic statutory
interpretation. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever en-
dorsed Haig-Simons. Even Collins, at the time the only federal income
tax case ever to invoke Haig-Simons explicitly as a rule of decision, ac-
knowledged that "[j]ust as 'the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics', the [sixteenth] Amendment does
not enact the Haig-Simons definition of income .... "254 Nevertheless,
Haig-Simons is close to becoming part of the evolving logic of the Code.
With Collins, Haig-Simons may well be slouching towards Bethlehem to
be born.255
251. See, e.g., HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1415 (1994);
Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492
(1995).
252. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 249, at 31-34.
253. Id. at 48-49.
254. Collins v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 557, 564 (1992) (citations omitted).
255. My apologies to Yeats. See, e.g., WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, THE SECOND COMING
AND OTHER POEMS 76 (2000).
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How, then, should we resolve Zarin? Should we merely agree to disa-
gree until consensus develops around a common approach to statutory
interpretation? I suggest not. Zarin itself illustrates many of the
strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches; an understanding of
the case may actually help us move in the right direction, however incre-
mentally, on the larger interpretive issues.
First, if nothing else, it should be clear from the general response to the
Third Circuit's opinion that a flat-footed plain language approach to in-
terpretation of the Code does not work. By this I mean it does not per-
suade, and leaves the court using it open to ridicule even if the court
thereby reaches the "right" result. I suggest further that any approach to
statutory interpretation that cannot be used in the tax arena-the quin-
tessential statutory context-is of dubious value.
Second, the debate over whether Congress can have "intent" is largely
academic. Even if Congress merely pretends to have reasons for what it
does, courts are obliged to respect those reasons, and they generally do.
The harder question is how to resolve apparent conflicts between the leg-
islative "intent" or statutory "purpose" of a particular provision and that
of the statutory system as a whole. Judge Ruwe's interpretation of
§ 108(e)(5) may have been consistent with the legislative history of that
section read in isolation but, it ignored the principle of complete account-
ing that seems compelled by the purposes of the Code as a whole. In the
absence of an express intention to override that principle, I suggest,
Ruwe's restricted inquiry was wrong.
Third, whether the Haig-Simons definition of income requires a victory
for Zarin or the IRS depends, I have argued, on whether winning is more
fun than losing. I think it is, and therefore believe that, in general, gam-
blers get little or no consumption value from losing. If so, we need not
decide whether Haig-Simons has yet been incorporated into the logic of
the Code since, in the absence of such incorporation, precedent would
have required a judgment for Zarin.
Finally, Zarin suggests that we should be cautious about raising Haig-
Simons to the status of law. Scholars love the power Haig-Simons gives
them; we can declare courts and Congress "wrong" simply by appealing
to principle. Nevertheless, the lay sensibilities that courts and Congress
bring to issues of tax policy should not be ignored. I suspect that the Tax
Court dissents and the Third Circuit majority were all founded, at least in
part, on an intuition that Zarin's situation was simply not what Congress
intended to tax when it enacted the Internal Revenue Code-regardless
of theory and logic-chopping lawyers. Formal adoption of Haig-Simons
as a rule of decision might well promote internal consistency and theoret-
ical purity; but it might also move the federal income tax system one step
further away from the commonsense notions of fairness that led to its
enactment in the first place. If we are forced to choose, legitimacy is




Of the various opinions rendered in the Zarin case itself, Judge Tan-
nenwald's had perhaps the most to commend it. As I hope this article
demonstrates, the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical issues raised by the
Zarin facts were thorny. The case itself, unusual in many regards, was
simply not the right vehicle for resolving them all. Judge Tannenwald's
approach would have disposed of the actual lawsuit without any signifi-
cant precedential effect. Law professors would have been deprived of a
wonderful teaching tool, but the real world would not have blinked an
eye.
What is the law currently? In Rood v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
held that a casino gambler was taxable on the discharge of his casino debt
where there were no disputes about either the enforceability or the
amount of the debt.25 6 This is, I suggest, a bizarre rule, not justifiable by
theory or statute. Under this rule, the discharge of gambling debts in-
curred in Nevada apparently will be taxable only if each debs are evi-
denced by a credit instrument, since gambling debts are not otherwise
legally enforceable in that state.25 7 The taxability of gambling debt dis-
charges in states like New Jersey, where gambling debts are enforceable
in some contexts and not others, will apparently turn on whether tax-
payer hires a lawyer to contest the casino's collection efforts before facing
the IRS. And in the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Hall is probably still
the law.2 58
What is the "right" answer? A strong practical argument can be made
that unenforceability should not determine whether discharged gambling
debt is taxable. A strong theoretical argument can be made that losing
gamblers do not receive commensurate consumption value, even if their
debts are enforceable. It may also be true that the Code does not treat
gambling as a consumption activity. And any tax rule governing the dis-
charge of gambling debts must work in both market and nonmarket con-
texts. For all of these reasons, I suggest that the rule of United States v.
Hall is in fact "correct"-that the discharge of gambling debts should be
treated as nontaxable per se.2 5 9
I close by returning to the real world. To say that Zarin "won" is true
only in the sense that surviving a ten-year nightmare is victory. In truth,
both Zarin and the IRS lost-all, it appears, because of a case that began
largely by accident. Zarin, I suggested at the outset, is a story of how law
works, and how it sometimes fails. In David Zarin's case, it failed.
256. See generally Rood v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3125 (1996).
257. See supra note 174.
258. See generally United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962).
259. For this purpose, I mean solely debts incurred in the course of gambling, not third-
party debts the proceeds of which are then lost in gambling. Debt incurred for the
purchase of lottery tickets need not, for this purpose, be treated as gambling debt, since it
is not subject to the one-step accounting analysis applicable to casino and similar debt.
Thus Collins v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 557 (1992), would not necessarily be in-




David Zarin passed away on November 18, 2005. His obituary in the
Press of Atlantic City recalled his real claim to fame, for which he much
preferred to be remembered:
Mr. Zarin was born in New York City and raised in Newark. After
graduating from the Newark College of Engineering, he began a long
and illustrious civil engineering and business career. He served as a
naval architect in Philadelphia during World War II. For the past
four decades, he developed numerous nursing homes and nearly
4,000 units of low and moderate income and senior housing in Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, and Florida. In Atlantic City, Mr. Zarin
helped start the revitalization of the South Inlet area with such
landmarks as New York Ave., Garden Court, Vermont Plaza, Light-
house Plaza, Metropolitan Plaza, and many others. A dedicated civic
leader and contributor to Atlantic City community projects, he
donated the 5,000 sq. ft. Sencit Baltic Family Practice Clinic, reno-
vated one of Atlantic City's best known landmarks, the World War I
memorial on Albany Ave., was a long-time benefactor of the South
Jersey Theater in Somers Point, and was a long-time supporter of the
Atlantic City Council of the Arts. He received numerous awards
and honors, including being named Citizen of the Year by the Atlan-
tic City Chamber of Commerce, was a recipient of the community's
Inter-Racial Award, and honored with the Alfred M. Heston Award
from the Atlantic City Public Library. 260
Helen W. Walsh, former Administrator of Atlantic County, N.J., eulo-
gized Zarin in the following terms: "David Zarin, a pioneer in the field of
affordable housing, tackled the issue here long before anyone else and
left a legacy of bricks and mortar in Atlantic City. ' 261 He "will be sorely
missed. 262
260. Obituaries, ATLANTIC CrrY PRESS, Nov. 20, 2005, at E2.
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